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ADJUDICATING INSURANCE POLICY
DISPUTES: A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR
RANDALL’S PROPOSAL TO ABANDON
CONTRACT LAW
Jared Wilkerson*
Introduction

T

here continues to be stark confusion and tense debate about
the proper role of courts in insurance disputes. Recently,
commentators have offered numerous proposals on how
insurance law — a special blend of contract law and public policy
— should be approached by the courts when interpreting
insurance policies.1 This article deals with one of those proposals
— that by Professor Susan Randall — in an attempt to calm
concerns it raises and to critique its necessity.2 Particularly, this
article argues that the current system of judicial interpretation of
* J.D./M.P.P. expected, The College of William & Mary. Special thanks to
Stephen P. Carney, Esq. for his comments and guidance; and to Stacy for her
patient encouragement.
1
Loosely following ERIC M. HOLMES & JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, HOLMES’
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d § 5.1 (Supp. 2010), I use the term
“interpretation” to mean the process of determining the meaning of the
contract. Many courts begin interpretation with a question of law: whether the
contractual terms themselves are clear and unambiguous to the hypothetical,
reasonable person. If they are, interpretation ends. If the terms are ambiguous,
however, interpretation sometimes becomes a question of fact that allows for
extrinsic evidence — although many courts, as this article will show, resort to
the strong contra proferentem doctrine before allowing extrinsic evidence. On
the other hand, some courts (like those in New Mexico) allow extrinsic
evidence at the first stage, that of determining whether the contractual terms
are ambiguous. “Construction” is simply the legal effect of contractual terms.
Thus, construction takes place after terms’ meaning to the parties has been
established through interpretation.
2
Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J.
107 (2008) [hereinafter Randall, Freedom of Contract].
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insurance policies as contracts, with regulatory oversight and
direction, adequately protects consumers.
Randall’s proposal is that courts should begin protecting
consumers from the dangers of adhesive contracts by refusing to
evaluate insurance policies as contracts at all — instead
interpreting them with the goal of effectuating the policy aims of
legislatures.3 Necessitating her proposal, Randall sees a supposed
recent judicial repudiation of consumer-protective judicial rules,
particularly the reasonable expectations doctrine, the strong
insurance-specific version of the contra proferentem doctrine, and
the perceived recent judicial refusal to recognize broad tort-based
bad faith remedies against insurers. These alleged problems are
set in the context of a perception that legislatures — not private
parties — already largely control insurance policies because
neither the insurers (due to pervasive legislation regulating
insurance policy language and content) nor the insured (because
policies are presented as standardized contracts of adhesion) have
the ability to freely contract. Thus, judicial ignorance of
consumers, in a supposedly sensitive regulated area, leads
Randall to propose that public policy and not contract law should
be the lens through which courts adjudicate coverage disputes.
This proposal has two flaws: first, there is no current or
recent wave of consumer-repudiating actions by courts in the
insurance context. In fact, courts have generally adhered to their
doctrines quite consistently for many years, giving policymakers
an opportunity to address problems against a consistent
background of judicial action. Indeed, a review of the states
whose common law Randall references when claiming that
consumer-protective doctrines have recently begun falling away
illustrates that state judicial branches have maintained a
relatively steady interpretive approach to insurance policy
disputes. Second, Randall’s proposal is an unpredictable vote of
zero confidence in state legislatures and insurance departments —
a direct attack on the legislative power to create and amend
policy.4 That is, she suggests that some measure of policymaking
3
Randall’s proposal deals little with the sophisticated insured, and this
article works under the assumption that her proposals would not apply to such
large and capable parties that can and should either draft or, at least,
understand policy language. For a discussion of sophisticated insureds and
particularly their treatment in contra proferentem cases, see JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, VOL. 1, § 4.11 (2d ed. 2006).
4
Although there are numerous separation of powers arguments to be
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power be ceded to courts. Since state legislatures have both the
authority and the motivation to regulate insurance in the interest
of consumers, business, and efficiency, problems with consumer
protection are adequately solved through the lawmaking process.
The problems Professor Randall points to,5 even assuming
that consumers are currently under-protected by current
regulatory schemes, should be addressed by legislatures, which
have the ability to balance priorities, recognize long-term and
wide-ranging public policy concerns, and provide benefits to the
state as a whole rather than to a particular plaintiff alone. Truly,
if courts were left to guess the mind and goals of the legislature as
Randall proposes, each case would become an opportunity for
courts, which are many steps removed from the legislative
process, to act as proxy for policymakers in a system that would
prevent insureds or insurers from knowing what their agreement
means until a court tells them. Insurance policies would become
nonbinding suggestions of bilateral duties rather than predictable
instruments whose clear language binds both parties.
Instead of using ever-shifting and uncertain legislative
goals as their guiding light, courts should be encouraged to
interpret legislation and apply the common law in an equitable,
consistent, and predictable way — something that most state
courts have been attempting to do for decades — and thereby
allow legislatures and insurance departments to do their job
against a stable adjudicatory backdrop. Legislatures, aware of
the current contract-based adjudicatory scheme, rarely alter it
and even create laws within it. One must presume that
legislatures refrain from changing the scheme because they are
comfortable with its protection of consumers — who also happen
to be constituent voters. A proposal like Professor Randall’s is
perilous because it would base judicial decision making on what
courts believe legislatures want, rather than allowing lawmakers
to conduct informed balancing of consumer protection, insurer
made against Professor Randall’s proposal, the article addresses them only
superficially, since the note’s primary purpose is to address the practical and
public policy aspects of what she suggests.
5
One obvious problem Randall does not point to is capture of
policymakers by the industry — an argument she dealt with in her article
Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625
(1999) [hereinafter Randall, Insurance Regulation]. Such an argument, like
those she offers in the current proposal, would not necessitate a change in the
judiciary. Rather, it would call for changes in lobbying laws.
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solvency, accessibility, and the other worthy goals of insurance
regulation while answering to the public.
Professor
Robert
Keeton’s
ill-fated
reasonable
expectations proposal — which called on courts to disregard
established insurance contract law in favor of validating the
ephemeral, reasonable expectations of insureds — parallels
Professor Randall’s current proposal.6 Keeton’s proposal was
doomed and rejected by nearly all jurisdictions because it did not
provide for consistent judicial decision making or the
establishment of predictable precedent. Similarly, Professor
Randall’s proposal, if adopted, would lead to economic and
judicial inefficiency that would engender higher rates, higher
litigation costs, and less insurance coverage for the very
consumers the proposal is meant to protect.
To evaluate and critique Randall’s proposal, this article
briefly introduces the main designers of insurance regulation and
the public interest aspects of insurance policies in Part I, followed
in Part II by insurance policies’ traditional contractual aspects. In
Part III, the article illustrates the special doctrines of insurance
interpretation and construction that Professor Randall says courts
have recently abandoned: reasonable expectations, contra
proferentem, and the action of bad faith against insurers. The
article then evaluates Professor Randall’s proposal in Part IV.
Concluding, the article argues that, given legislatures’ extensive
protection of consumers and lawmakers’ ability to adjust the
rules that courts apply, judges in each state should continue to
treat insurance policies consistently to provide their respective
legislatures with a steady judicial setting against which to
balance public policy. Courts should not, as Randall advocates,
treat
insurance
contracts
as
consumer-protecting
instrumentalities to be construed in light of the legislature’s
unstated intent—intent that may change with every election. By
relying on consistent principles of statutory application and
insurance contract law, courts rightly leave the duty of balancing
consumer protection, insurer solvency, access to insurance, and
other policy goals to legislatures and insurance departments. This
is true regardless of whether the courts employ the reasonable
expectations doctrine, a strong contra proferentem doctrine, or a
cause of action in tort for breach of insurance policy.
6
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions (Parts I and II), 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) and 83 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1970).
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Predictability will allow insurance companies to continue
gathering relevant data and to underwrite policies with the most
reasonable premiums, because predictability allows insurers to
estimate losses with relative certainty and to justify their
premiums to the marketplace and to regulators based on these
empirical, actuarial predictions. Consistency promotes the best
protection for consumers as created both by market forces and
consumers’ own elected representatives.
I. Insurance Law’s Roots in State Policy and Regulation
The insurance industry is highly regulated because of its
enormous importance to not only individual policyholders, but
the public generally.7 Indeed, every insurance policy is both a
private contract and an implement of public policy. Further,
those types of insurance which are more important to the public,
like health insurance and workers’ compensation, are subject to
heavier regulation. Additionally, like banks and other financial
institutions, insurance companies hold — and take investment
risks with — other peoples’ money. There is also ample
opportunity for insurance companies to contribute to or even
create social stratification and discrimination.8 Thus, among
other things, regulation must ensure that these companies are
solvent while charging reasonable premiums, that they employ
sound underwriting standards while avoiding undue
discrimination, and that they provide broad access while not
spreading capital too thinly.9 Both the social and the individual
aspects of insurance must be respected by regulation, allowing
individuals freedom to contract while encouraging society to treat
its members fairly and to protect citizens and their transactions.10
7

See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §2:1 n.2
(2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2008) (stating “Congress hereby declares that
the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest. . . .”) (emphasis added)) [hereinafter COUCH
ON INSURANCE].
8
See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 637–43 (2d ed. 2008).
9
For a general discussion of the rationales behind insurance regulation,
see id. at 1–21.
10
Some types of insurance, such as auto and homeowners’ insurance, are
even seen as playing a gatekeeping role for society: if a person cannot protect
others from his own liability (i.e., if he does not have insurance), he should not
be able to engage in favored activities (e.g., driving or owning a home). See id.
at 9–12.
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Consequently, insurance is a heavily-regulated industry that
often acts as an arm of the government to reflect legislative goals
and an arm of civil society to reflect social goals such as
trustworthiness, accountability, freedom, and solidarity.11
State legislatures, state insurance departments, and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) are
the primary official or semi-official players in insurance
regulation; in addition to courts, Congress, and the industry itself.
To present the public policy of insurance law, it is necessary to
introduce these top players.
A. State Legislatures
State regulation of the business of insurance has always
been the norm in the United States.12 In fact, when Congress
finally addressed the question in 1944, states had already been
regulating insurance for well over one hundred years. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act13 was simply Congress’s reaction to the
Supreme Court’s declaration that insurance was an
11

Id. at 12–21.
Federal statutes regulating the corporate nature of insurance companies,
such as the tax code, employment laws, and securities laws, always control
insurance companies because these do not deal with the “business of
insurance.” See, e.g., SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
(stating variable annuities do not fall under the business of insurance and are
therefore subject to SEC registration requirements); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453 (1969) (holding an Arizona law meant to protect stockholders of
insurance companies does not fall under the McCarran-Ferguson Act because
it deals with securities and stockholder-company relations rather than insurerinsured relations, i.e., the business of insurance; thus, the SEC can regulate the
stockholder-insurance company relations). Additionally, federal laws that
overlap with a state’s regulation of insurance but do not directly target
insurance or “invalidate, impair, or supersede” the state’s regulatory scheme
are often upheld as long as there is no direct conflict and the impact of the
federal law does not unduly influence the state scheme. See generally Humana
Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999) (stating that, with regard to RICO’s
interference of Nevada’s regulation of insurance under 18 U.S.C. § 1012(b),
“[w]hen federal law does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when
application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or
interfere with a State’s administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not preclude its application.”) (cited with approval in Weiss v. First
Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a cause of action
under RICO was possible even though the petitioner was suing an insurance
company that was otherwise regulated by New Jersey state law).
13
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2010).
12
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implementation of interstate commerce and, thus, subject to
congressional regulation.14 Before Southeastern Underwriters,
states regulated insurance thanks in part to tradition and largely
because of Paul v. Virginia, a counterintuitive Supreme Court
ruling in 1868 that insurance was not subject to congressional
regulation because “issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce.”15 At the time of Paul, after decades of
regulation at the state level, many insurers hoped for federal
regulation because so much of their business crossed state lines,
making them lose time and money by dealing with differing
regulatory schemes.16 The Court halted their hopes.17
Ironically, the Court also differed from the wishes of many
insurers and state regulators in 1944 when it reversed itself in
Southeastern Underwriters, which frightened both the industry
and state regulators by making insurance (including, most
importantly, rate-fixing) subject to such broad-reaching federal
laws as the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the Federal Trade
Commission Act — in addition to potentially stripping the states
of some insurance company tax revenue.18 Thus, three-quarters of
a century after Paul, industry leaders and regulators were not
only happy with the state scheme, they wanted to see it succeed.
Thus, they lobbied for the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in which
Congress stated:
The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business. . . .No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of
14

United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 22 U.S. 533 (1944).
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
16
See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471,
472–73 (1961) (discussing the beginning of state insurance regulation in the
1820s and its normalization throughout the 1850s and 1860s).
17
Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, at 630–31.
18
See Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State
Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical
Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553–56 (1958) (describing the desire of the
insurance industry for federal regulation until Southeastern Underwriters
scared them — and state regulators — into lobbying for the McCarranFerguson Act).
15
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insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance.19
McCarran-Ferguson pleased both insurers and state
regulators, but Congress maintained its ability to step into
insurance regulation if states did not perform well enough. To
protect themselves, insurers and state regulators banded together
more closely than they had in the past — strengthening the
NAIC, which was already decades old — and created model
regulations that would allow insurers to avoid seemingly onerous
federal laws and permit state regulators to improve the quality
and scope of their own regulations while maintaining control and
taxation of insurance.20
Thus, Congress has left insurance regulation to state
legislatures, unless it passes a federal law that specifically
regulates insurance for the entire nation.21 Indeed, every state has
an insurance code, a detailed body of legislation that governs how
the business of insurance is to be conducted within the state.
However, even with broad authority in this area, state laws must
conform to greater federal and state constitutional concerns that
apply to all legislation, such as due process, equal protection,
contract impairment, and uncompensated takings, in addition to
avoiding federal preemption in those areas that Congress has
acted to explicitly regulate insurance.22
19

15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2010).
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 18, at 555.
21
Companies can also step outside the protection of the McCarranFerguson Act if they engage in boycotts, coercion, or intimidation. See
generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (interpreting
15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2010), which states that “[n]othing contained in this
chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”).
22
COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 2:2. Since this articles deals
with insurance contracts — and possible interference of them through more
adjudicatory power — it must be noted that the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1, has been interpreted liberally in the insurance context.
Review of regulations affecting contracts is subject to something akin to
rational basis review. If the legislation has a significant and legitimate public
purpose and the contract impairment is attributable to reasonable conditions
related to the public purpose, it will be upheld. See generally Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). However, a
small number of such challenges have been upheld: see, e.g., Smith v. Dep’t. of
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (a section of the state’s Tort Reform and
Insurance Act was found to violate the Contract Clause because it required all
20
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State regulation has been the norm even since the GrammLeach-Bliley Act (viz. the Financial Services Modernization
Act)23 of 1999 allowed the consolidation of two federallyregulated industries (banking and securities) with the stateregulated insurance industry, providing for the creation of the
“financial services industry” that brought us the sub-prime
mortgage/investment-backed securities crisis of 2007.24 In light of
the crisis and perceived inefficiencies, many commentators have
written proposals to attack state regulation, the most salient
suggestion being for a single-licensing, federal charter option that
would allow insurance companies to seek a federal charter
permitting them access to all fifty states, while maintaining
states’ ability to compete over the details not addressed by the
minimum federal standards.25 Others, even members of Congress,
have proposed more wholesale federal regulation even though,
judging by the arguably negative effects of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, federal regulation might not be a good solution.26 The
closest federal law has come to broadly regulating insurance is
commercial liability policies in effect between certain dates to provide credits
or rebates because of probable benefits stemming from tort reform); Health
Ins. Ass’n of America v. Harnett, 376 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 1978) (mandatory
maternity care could not be required in guaranteed renewal policies).
23
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006).
24
For a discussion of the problems with the Financial Services
Modernization Act and its probable connection to the recent financial crisis,
see Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together
Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to
the 2008–2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 371
(2010); Paul Krugman, The Gramm Connection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008,
available
at
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/the-grammconnection/.
25
See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Single-License
Solution, REGULATION, Winter 2008-2009, at 36 available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/ regulation/regv31n4/v31n4-6.pdf; Leo Donatucci,
Current Issues in Public Policy: Federal Regulation of the Insurance Industry:
One for All and All for Who? How Federal Regulation Would Help the
Industry Into the New Millennia, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 398 (2010).
26
See, e.g., National Insurance Protection Act, H.R. 1880 (introduced by
Reps. Bean (D–IL) and Royce (D–CA) 111th Cong (2009) (proposes the creation
of an Office of National Insurance within the Department of the Treasury,
with power to license, regulate and supervise national insurers); see also
Donatucci, supra note 25, at 398; see generally BAIRD WEBEL & CAROLYN
COBB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31982, INSURANCE REGULATION:
HISTORY, BACKGROUND, AND RECENT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2005),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ RL31982_20050211.pdf.
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the creation, within the Department of the Treasury, of the
Federal Insurance Office, which was part of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.27 This law,
passed in July 2010, is a response to the recent recession. Because
insurance is often found under the same roof as banking and
securities services, and given that players such as AIG
contributed to the economic downturn, insurance was a natural
target of the Dodd-Frank bill. However, the bill appears to be
fairly innocuous as to insurance regulation. In relevant part, the
Office is only granted power to monitor and collect data from the
insurance industry, to analyze those data, to consult with states
on matters of federal and international concern, to make annual
reports to Congress and the President, to preempt state laws that
treat certain non-United States insurers less favorably than
United States insurers, and to give advice to the Secretary of the
Treasury and the newly-created Financial Stability Oversight
Council on risky insurers. In fact, subsection (k) of § 502 (the
section establishing and defining the office) states that the Office
is not given “general supervisory or regulatory authority over the
business of insurance.” For now, then, insurance regulation at the
legislative level is squarely in the hands of states, aside from those
few instances in which Congress has specifically affected
insurance.28
Legislatures regulate insurance both by passing laws and
by empowering state agencies — i.e., insurance departments — to
administer many of those laws. Some laws are even written for
the courts to apply. For example, many states have rules that
restrict courts’ ability to construe insurance applications or
policies against the insured.29 With such legislative ability to
27

Pub. L. 111-203 §§ 501–543, 111th Cong. (2010).
See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 1001–1461 (West 2010) (preempting state insurance law that
operates on self-funded employer health plans).
29
See generally, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-300–325 (West 2010). A salient
example is § 38.2-309 (requiring courts to construe statements on an insurance
application as representations rather than warranties and requiring courts to
find coverage even in the face of applicant misrepresentations, unless the
insurer can prove that it relied on the material misstatement when granting
coverage). See also CAL. INS. CODE § 382.5(e) (West 2010) (stating that binders
must be construed as insurance policies); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3106 (McKinney
2010) (defining “warranty” and preventing a court from finding avoidance of
an insurance contract for breach of warranty unless the breach materially
increase the risk of loss under the contract); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.054
28
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protect consumers even through the courts, one may legitimately
question whether Randall’s proposal (and others like it30) are
solutions in search of a problem. That is, with the legislature
protecting insureds both directly and through insurance
departments, what reason do commentators have to seek new
judicial doctrines that presumably attempt the same thing in a
less uniform and predictable way?
B. Insurance Departments
Insurance departments (or bureaus) are the states’
administrative agencies that, under power given them by the
legislature, regulate insurance.31 The power of each states’
respective department is usually vested in the hands of an
insurance commissioner or superintendent, under whose
authority the department can normally (1) create and implement
rules regulating insurance (including rates, market conduct,
accessibility, pre-approval of insurance policy language,32
construction of policy language, etc.); (2) issue cease and desist
orders or bring enforcement actions in court against those
breaking rules or statutes related to insurance; and (3) enlist the
aid of the Attorney General and state prosecutors when engaged
in civil or criminal enforcement.33 Although these departments
are administrative agencies, decision makers and administrative
judges within the departments (or, more likely, within a
(Vernon 2005) (requiring that the entire subsection be liberally construed to
require prompt payment of claims).
30
See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance
Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should not Be Construed Against the Drafter,
30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV.
203 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009).
31
In some states, such as New York, the insurance department is an
independent state agency; in others, such as Virginia, it is a subsection of a
larger department, such as a state corporation commission.
32
From one perspective, the fact that the language of the policy has been
approved by the state insurance department suggests that the insured has
already been protected — although this view is subject to the criticism that
insurance departments are overworked and understaffed, and simply cannot
foresee all possible conflicts under policy language.
33
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12.1-16 (2010); CODE OF VA. § 12.1-16 (2010);
REV. CODE OF WASH. § 48.02 (2010).
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generalist department of administrative adjudication)34 do not
normally35 adjudicate insurance policy disputes between
34

See generally Michael Asimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to the
Administrative Law Review Symposium on State Administrative Law, 53
ADMIN L. REV. 395, 398–99 (2001) (discussing the origins and rise of the
central administrative judicial panel, noting that a majority of states and many
large cities used central panels).
35
Three notable and often consumer-protecting bends in this rule are: (1)
the adjudication of unfair trade practices; (2) the adjudication of rights (even
perhaps contract rights) that are “incidental to” an agency’s proper
adjudicatory authority; and (3) the preliminary adjudication of private
disputes that are comprehensively regulated.
First, most states have enacted a version of the Model Unfair Trade
Practices act (promulgated by the NAIC as a model act), which is meant to
protect consumers from statutorily-defined unfair actions (including improper
discrimination) of insurance companies in raising rates or in denying,
narrowing, or halting coverage. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 710–11. These
acts often provide for private causes of action (see infra, Part IV(A)(3)), in
addition to the ability of the insurance commissioner to bring an action before
the agency, which allow a harmed insured to seek damages from the insurer in
court. See COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 4:20 (giving examples
from various jurisdictions). However, when a statute or the common law (by
implying a cause of action from the statute; see, e.g., Stonewall Jackson Mem’l
Hosp. Co. v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 525 S.E.2d 649, 656 (W. Va. 1999)) does
not provide for a private cause of action, the investigation and decision of the
issue is usually left solely to the state insurance commissioner, who conducts a
hearing and rules for or against the insurer, meeting out cease and desist orders
or penalties. See COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 4:20. In such cases,
the dispute is not between the insured and the insurer but between the
commissioner and the insurer. However, since insurers often bring such suits
about by the filing of complaints, and since they often testify at the hearing,
this can be considered a bend—however slight—in the general rule that
administrative adjudications do not involve private contract rights.
Second, it is well established in many jurisdictions that where an
administrative adjudication involves private rights that are incidental to and
naturally decided together with the agency’s determination of public rights,
the agency can decide those private rights. See, e.g., McHugh v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 104 (Cal. 1989) (citing cases from various
states).
Third, the state legislature can create a scheme by which seemingly
private rights are adjudicated under a comprehensive regulatory framework.
For example, workers’ compensation statutes often provide for administrative
adjudication of coverage disputes. See, e.g., Dee Enters. v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Office of State of Colo., 89 P.3d 430, 432 (Colo. App. 2003) (citing
cases from numerous jurisdictions) (upholding administrative agency’s
determination, against the employer’s and the insurance company’s factual
and separation of powers objections, that coverage was due the injured
worker). Additionally, some states have begun permitting administrative
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individuals and their insurers. As one insurance commissioner
put it, “I do not adjudicate controversies between consumers and
insurers, nor can I direct an insurer to pay a particular claim or
amount on a claim. That’s for the courts.”36 Although they do not
have the subject-matter expertise of the agencies, courts do have
the weight of tradition, common-law stability, and constitutional
authority behind them.
Everything the agency does is circumscribed in its
enabling statute — all of its actions must be explicitly or
implicitly allowed by that statute as written by the state
legislature; thus, insurance departments are meant to administer
the will of the state legislature.37 Each department’s enabling
statute is slightly different, but there are general themes across
states. In their quasi-judicial role, the departments often deal
with licensing, workers’ compensation appeals, state workers’
group insurance appeals, appeals from disciplined insurance
agencies to preliminarily adjudicate complaints from insureds regarding the
improper denial or delay of payments from their insurer. For example, in
Maryland, the Courts Article not only provides for an action in bad faith, it
also provides for preliminary administrative determination of the insured’s
claim. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1701 (West 2010). This is the
closest administrative agencies come to adjudicating private contractual
disputes between insurers and insureds. However, even in such workers’
compensation and bad faith cases, ultimate judicial review of the
administrative decision is necessary to enforce payment and thus the decisions
lack finality. Id.; Dee Enters., 89 P.3d at 434.
All three of these quasi-exceptions to the general rule support the main
argument: legislatures, which have accepted the duty to create policy that best
balances consumer protection with the other goals of insurance regulation, are
protecting consumers both through statute and through insurance
departments; the courts have no need to adopt new standards of interpretation
and construction.
36
Alfred W. Gross, Virginia Commissioner of Insurance, Address at the
William & Mary School of Law (Nov. 30, 2010). It should be noted that an
“administrative law of contracts” has been proposed, particularly in the area of
adhesive contracts, which proposal would allow contracts to be adjudicated
through administrative agencies. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 533
(1971). This proposal has gained little traction, and even adhesive contracts
have largely been left to judicial — rather than administrative —
interpretation.
37
COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 2:8 (stating “[a]lthough the
insurance commission has a wide range of discretion in discharging the duties
and responsibilities imposed upon it, it has no inherent powers and may only
exercise those that have been expressly granted to it by constitution or statute,
or those that are necessarily or reasonably implied therefrom”).
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agents, reimbursement of public hospital medical care costs, etc.38
In their quasi-legislative role, many departments develop and
issue binding rules regulating rates, market conduct,
discrimination, underwriting procedures, cash reserves and
equity requirements, etc.39 In their quasi-executive role, the
departments police the market by performing solvency and
consumer treatment inspections, initiating investigations into
violations of rules and laws, and issuing fines, injunctions, or
taking a company through receivership and dissolution. Criminal
prosecutions have to be carried out by the state Attorney
General’s office, often at the department’s behest.40 Additionally,
insurance commissioners may advocate public policy alternatives
by working with the legislature to clarify the effect of proposals
on citizens and businesses.41
In none of these activities do insurance departments
involve themselves with resolving contractual disputes between
an insurer and an insured. They do, of course, issue rules
regulating the relationship between insurers and insureds and
they also can investigate and enforce rules against insurers who
do not treat insureds fairly, but insurance departments do not, in
most cases, have authority to adjudicate private contracts — that
is, disputes that do not involve a government actor.42 Thus,
although insurance departments are often granted broad powers
to act as an administrative agency, and can therefore help
determine the decisional rules of courts,43 they are not given the
ability to act as common law courts themselves. Although
Randall’s proposal does advocate a consumer-interest approach
to insurance contract adjudications, she does not go so far as to
suggest that these disputes should be carried out by state
administrative judges.
Insurance commissioners and, by extension, their
38

HOLMES & APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at §§ 170.1–5.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Gross, supra note 36.
42
See, e.g., Texas’s State Office of Administrative Hearings website,
http://www.soah.state.tx.us/about-us/SOAH-teams.asp, which details the cases
they adjudicate. Although some are appeals from the state’s Department of
Insurance, none of them are contract disputes between private parties.
43
See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 613 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1993) (the
Superintendent of Insurance issued regulations that acted as persuasive
authority to overturn judicial precedent, causing a later case to be decided
differently).
39
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departments, do not work in home-state-centric vacuums.
Although their individual authority (including the authority to
affect how courts interpret policy language) is binding only in
their state, each commissioner is a member of the NAIC, which
has de facto authority to, if nothing else, nudge and incentivize
individual commissioners to be part of the crowd.
C. NAIC
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
was formed in 1871, shortly after the Paul decision.44 As an
association with no de jure public power, its original mission was
to foster economic efficiency by seeking uniformity in insurance
regulation — a role that it has continued to play but that has
become more important as federal pressure for greater uniformity
has continued to grow.45 Officially,
[t]he mission of the NAIC is to assist state insurance
regulators, individually and collectively, in serving the
public interest and achieving the following fundamental
insurance regulatory goals in a responsive, efficient and
cost effective manner, consistent with the wishes of its
members:
Protect the public interest;
Promote competitive markets;
Facilitate the fair and equitable treatment of insurance
consumers;
Promote the reliability, solvency and financial solidity
of insurance institutions; and
Support and improve state regulation of insurance.46

44

Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, at 630.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-372,
INSURANCE RECIPROCITY AND UNIFORMITY: NAIC AND STATE
REGULATORS HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN PRODUCER LICENSING, PRODUCT
APPROVAL, AND MARKET CONDUCT REGULATION, BUT CHALLENGES
REMAIN 6–8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09372.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-372].
46
About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/
45
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In furtherance of these somewhat vague goals, the NAIC
engages in various activities meant to encourage — or, as some
argue,47 impose — a baseline of strong, consistent regulation in
every state. Randall described these activities in her oft-cited
article on NAIC’s involvement in insurance regulation:
The NAIC performs centralized duties that mirror those
of federal regulators in other industries, including the
prescription of standard forms for insurance company
annual financial statements; the coordination of regional
financial examinations of insurance companies; the
creation and maintenance of an extensive system of
national databases to facilitate state monitoring of
insurers and insurance agents; the rating of non-U.S.
insurers for the states; the periodic review and
accreditation of state insurance departments; the
drafting of model laws and regulations, many of which
have been adopted by state legislatures; the valuation of
insurance company investments; training of state
insurance regulators; the preparation of statistical
reports for state regulators; the assistance to state
regulators with technical financial analysis; and the
assistance to U.S. officials negotiating international
trade agreements that concern insurance issues. The
NAIC makes most of its money by selling data to
states.48
Currently, the insurance commissioners from all fifty
states and the District of Columbia (plus the four U.S. territories)
are members of the NAIC, and the Association strives to walk the
thin line between establishing important national standards and
allowing the states to adapt these standards to their particular
needs. However, avoiding strong de facto impositions on states
has been difficult since NAIC started its accreditation system. In
index_about.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
47
See, e.g., Kimberley A. Strassel, Carbon Caps through the Backdoor:
Environmentalists Pressure the Insurance Industry, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 4,
2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703862704
575100004067589846.html (arguing that environmental groups had made
NAIC force all commissioners to complete a survey that would coerce states
into capping emissions); see also Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5,
at 636, n. 67.
48
Randall, supra note 5, at 636–38.
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the late 1980s, after some large insurers went bankrupt,
commentators called for federal regulation of company solvency
so as to provide national minimum standards to avoid regulatory
races to the bottom and, ultimately, more insolvency.49 In
response, the NAIC created its solvency-focused accreditation
system, called the Financial Regulation Standards Accreditation
Program. All states and the District have met minimum
requirements and are accredited under this program.50 Similarly,
in response to a more recent outcry for national regulation of
insurance company market conduct, the NAIC is close to
implementing its Market Conduct Accreditation Program.51 The
dialogue between federal (often congressional) actors and the
NAIC shows how the NAIC (and, by extension, the states) must
respond to federal pressure or face preemption. Indeed, the
NAIC’s bowing to cries for federal reformation is likely part of
the reason that Congress has done relatively little — beyond
threats that bring the commissioners to agree to standardized
regulation — to regulate insurance.
NAIC’s existence and involvement in state regulation of
insurance demonstrates another layer of protection for
consumers. Not only does the NAIC propose homegrown actions,
but it also acts as a forum for insurance commissioners from
various states to compare and contrast their consumer protections
with those of other jurisdictions.52 This process of
experimentation and communication can lead to consumer
protections that are efficient (in both the equitable and economic
sense) and applicable to each state. Further, the NAIC has
already shown a desire to respond with solutions whenever the
federal government looks at state regulation with a critical eye.
This also leads to more and, one would hope, improved
49

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-948, INSURANCE
REGULATION: THE NAIC ACCREDITATION PROGRAM CAN BE IMPROVED 3
(2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01948.pdf.
50
See Financial Standards Regulation Program Accredited States, NAT’L
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/committees_f_accredited_
states.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). For some time, New York, which the
NAIC itself recognized as having an exemplary system of regulating the
solvency of insurance companies, was not accredited by the NAIC because its
system, while exemplary, was different than the NAIC requirements. Randall,
supra note 5, at 652–53.
51
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-372,
supra note 45, at 28–36.
52
Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, at 634–39.
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protections for consumers.53
In sum, state legislatures, insurance departments, and the
NAIC are deeply interrelated and all three work — sometimes in
concert — to protect consumers by promoting faithful insurer
behavior, insurer solvency, broad access to insurance, and even
mandated policy language and interpretive mandates. State
legislatures have near plenary power over insurance regulation,
but they delegate much of the administration of that regulation to
their insurance departments, which are headed by insurance
commissioners who are members of the NAIC. Under the
NAIC’s equalizing influence and model laws, in addition to
states’ desire to be different and attractive to business, insurance
is regulated by a system that is nearly uniform in purpose and
scope while still being flexible in detail. Particularly, most states
declare that their goals are to ensure fair premiums, guarantee
insurance company solvency, prevent unfair market conduct, and
make insurance coverage widely available.54 Under this system,
regulation is both predictable and adjustable. Inserting the
various common law courts’ narrow policy judgments into the
regulatory realm, as Randall proposes, would push the entire
system toward uncertainty, and uncertainty would lead to
inefficiency and injustice for insurers and insureds alike.
II. The Contract Roots of Insurance Law
The roots of insurance in contract law are deceptively
simple. They are rested here using broad generalities to remind
the reader that, as a natural home, there is no better place for
insurance policy interpretation and construction than contract
law.
Contracts come by way of offer, acceptance, and
consideration. In the insurance context, the offer is generally
made not by the insurer but by the potential insured, when she
fills out and submits an application for insurance.55 A blank
53

Id.
Id. at 629 (citing ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW § 22 (2d ed. 1996)); Kimball, supra note 16, at 477-78; see also BAKER,
supra note 8, at 637–56 (describing the goals of insurance regulation, the role of
the NAIC in coordinating state regulatory efforts, and the boundaries of state
authority over insurance).
55
COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 11:1 (citing various cases from
numerous states and giving exceptions to these general rules).
54
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application given to a potential insured is not an offer but a mere
proposal to enter into a contractual relationship. Acceptance is
generally by the insurer, when it grants coverage based on the
completed application.56 Consideration is based, for the insured,
in the premiums paid for the insurance, and for the insurer, in
indemnification when a covered loss occurs.57
Nearly all insurance policies are contracts of adhesion,
meaning that the applicant (offeror) must either adhere to the
terms of the policy written by the company (offeree) or not be
granted insurance.58 There is some leeway in this statement, such
as the ability, in some circumstances, for consumers to mix and
match types and amounts of coverage while still being denied the
ability to change the mix available for matching or the terms
under which each option operates; additionally, some insureds
are so sophisticated that they are allowed the privilege of either
approving or drafting the policy language.59 However, for the
most part, insurance contracts are adhesive contracts; indeed,
some commentators have gone so far as to label them “superadhesive” contracts because, even though they are not prohibited
from doing so, many insureds do not even see the policy language
before applying for coverage and because all insurance
companies offer roughly identical coverage.60 Adhesive contracts
are usually associated with an imbalance of information; in the
insurance case, this simply means that the insurance companies,
which drafted the contract or chose a standardized form to apply,
have much more information regarding the meaning of the
56

Id. at § 11:3.
See, e.g., American Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartsfield, 248 S.E.2d 518, 520
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (generally, nonpayment of premiums when due results in a
forfeiture of the policy); Hargis v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 388
N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (failure to timely pay premiums can
subject the insured to waiver and/or estoppel); Hampton v. Metro. Ins. Co.,
528 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (insurance policies are contracts; if the
premiums are not paid, the policy lapses for want of performance); St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 301 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Neb. 1981) (the regular
payment of premiums is the essence of an insurance contract; without it, the
policy lapses); see also American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. BIM, Inc. 885
F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1989) (there is no insurance where there is no payment).
58
See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION 531–36 (4th ed. 2005).
59
See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the Sophisticated Policyholder
Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807, 831–33
(1993).
60
Id.; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 58, at 534.
57
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contract and its contents than the consumer.61
The fact that a substantial amount of coverage is required
by law adds an element of force to the adhesive nature of
insurance. For example, automobile liability insurance,
homeowner’s insurance, and worker’s compensation insurance
are required in certain circumstances.62
In addition to being contracts of adhesion, insurance
policies are standardized contracts, meaning that the language is
boilerplate and similar or identical from one insurer (and state)63
to another — indeed, many insurance contracts are chosen by
insurers from a list of available options drafted by the Insurance
Services Office (“ISO”).64 Standardization allows insurance
companies and the NAIC to gather data based on comparable
language in order to make precise underwriting predictions both
within and across states.65 A side effect of standardization is that
it perpetuates confusing language — not because the insurance
companies think that the language is clear to consumers, but
because the language is predictable in court.66
61

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 125.
JERRY, supra note 54, at 996–98; See generally WEST 50 STATE
SURVEYS, INSURANCE—UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
(West 2006); ALAN WIDISS, 3 UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE 22 (Anderson Publishing, 2d ed. 1985).
63
State courts, when interpreting a particular term for the first time, may
look to interpretations of the term from other states. See Fisher v. Tyler, 394
A.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Md. 1978) (“[T]he application of this policy provision in a
factual posture similar to that presented here, has been before the courts of our
sister states. The decisions of these jurisdictions have special significance in
this context because heretofore this Court has recognized that ‘like a state
which adopts, by copying, a foreign statute, . . . parties who adopt an insurance
policy, which apparently has had nationwide use and has been judicially
construed in five or six states, adopt with it the uniform judicial construction
that it has received in other states.’ In other words, while the contract term on
its face may be ambiguous, which under other circumstances would ordinarily
generate a jury question, . . . the court in this situation may treat the term as
unambiguous and, absent any factual dispute, adopt, as a matter of law, that
construction placed on the language by the courts of other states.”) (citations
omitted). In other words, courts in one state help courts in other states to issue
consistent and predictable rulings — contributing favorably to the reliability
that federal regulators have been seeking lately.
64
See, e.g., STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at §
4.05[A].
65
Id.; Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 124.
66
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2006); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v.
62
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Sophisticated insureds are often an exception to standard
insurance policy interpretation. The basic reason for treating
sophisticated insureds differently than others is that they, or their
agents and attorneys, write, bargain for, or at least understand
the policy language that binds them; therefore, they should not
reap benefits from strong rules meant to protect more vulnerable
insureds who effectively do not know what they are getting into.67
Sophisticated insureds pose problems for interpreting courts,
which have granted protection of the strong contra proferentem
rule to some sophisticated insureds while withholding it from
others; indeed, much depends on the degree to which a
sophisticated insured negotiated for particular terms.68 Courts
and commentators also debate who should be considered a
sophisticated insured: should the definition include sophisticated
parties just because their attorneys can understand the policy’s
implications, or should the definition only include those parties
that actually draft or, less stringently, negotiate for policy terms?69
Such questions form part of the rationale for proposals to reform
judicial interpretation and construction of insurance policies
because they are examples and sources of the uncertainty
surrounding these judicial actions.
Given that insurance policies are contracts — special and
problematic contracts, but contracts nonetheless — it makes
sense that common law courts interpret them according to
contract law. The judiciary, however, has also recognized that
insurance contracts are instruments of public policy just as they
are examples of private ordering; thus, many have taken pains to
place one foot into the realm of individual consumer (plaintiff)
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. 482 F.3d 976, 977 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[insurance
companies] are reluctant to alter policy language once its meaning has been
settled by judicial decision”) (citing sources).
67
See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 59, at 849–56 (arguing for differential
treatment of sophisticated insureds when various factors are weighed against
them); c.f., Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception,
39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003).
68
See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225
F.3d 270, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that, under New York law, where a
sophisticated insured has not negotiated for terms, the insured should benefit
from the contra proferentem doctrine — which in New York allows for
extrinsic evidence before application).
69
See generally, COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 22:24 (citing
numerous cases for the differing approaches to the treatment of sophisticated
insureds).
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protection while keeping the other firmly grounded on the
traditional principles of contract interpretation and construction.
The problems of mass-standardization and adhesion sometimes
lead courts to give up traditional contract principles in favor of
consumer-oriented rules such as those discussed in the next
section.
III. Consumer Protection by Courts
Courts treat insurance policy interpretation in various
ways because of the issues of standardization and adhesion, as
well as insurance’s role in protecting public policy. Generally,
courts treat insurance policies as contracts with special rules of
interpretation and construction. Some of these rules (and those
that Randall focuses on as the basis for her proposal) are (1) an
especially potent form of the contra proferentem doctrine; (2) the
pure reasonable expectations doctrine; and (3) liberal availability
of bad faith remedies against insurers that act improperly.70
Although they have never been uniform, some worry that courts
generally have begun to abandon these special consumerprotective rules, leading to proposals like Professor Randall’s.
This section introduces some of the more salient controversies in
the protection of insureds, giving a baseline for the proposal’s
evaluation in the next section.
A. The Insurance-Tailored (Strong) Contra proferentem Doctrine
Contra proferentem, translated literally to “against the
offeror,”71 is a doctrine that courts use to favor an insured’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous policy term over an
70

This article omits another major consumer-protective doctrine, namely
that of unconscionability, because Randall does not address it. However, it is
important to remember that, in many jurisdictions, where adhesive policy
terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter (insurer), those terms can be
modified or struck down. Both courts and legislatures have provided for the
unconscionability doctrine to protect consumers. See, e.g., Donald Zupanec,
Annotation, Doctrine of Unconscionability as Applied to Insurance Contracts
86 A.L.R.3d 862 (1978) (citing numerous cases); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50 (West 2009) (allowing for actions flowing from unconscionable
insurance contracts). Indeed, some courts see insurance policies as being
subject to UCC Title 2’s prohibition against unconscionable contracts. See,
e.g., Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1093-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
71
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir.
1991).
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insurer’s. In its general form, as used in normal contract
interpretation, the doctrine is a rule of last resort that is employed
only when a court cannot — by the contract’s plain language or
even by extrinsic evidence — determine the parties’ intent.72
However, in the insurance context, the rule has taken on a
meaning more favorable to insureds. For example, one
conception of the rule as applied to ambiguous exclusions is that:
[I]f a policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation . . . “Texas law requires an insurance
policy to be construed against the insurer and in favor
of the insured”—in other words, in favor of
coverage. Where an exclusionary provision is
ambiguous—that is, amenable to two or more
reasonable interpretations—the court must adopt the
construction urged by the insured so long as that
construction is not unreasonable, even if the insurer’s
construction “appears to be more reasonable or a more
accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”73
Thus, as it is still often construed, even in some of the
states that Randall claims have turned against the doctrine, the
contra proferentem doctrine is stronger when applied to insurance
contracts than when applied to contracts in other areas. It often
applies before reference is made to extrinsic evidence, and
therefore favors insureds upon the discovery of any ambiguity.
Professor Randall argues that Texas’s approach is among a dying
breed: “In recent years, commentators have advocated for
adherence to usual contract rules,74 and courts have increasingly
72

See generally, CORBIN

ON

CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,

2010).
73

Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 600 F.3d
562, 569 (5th Cir. 2010); however, compare Evergreen Nat. Indem. Co. v. Tan
It All, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 669, 676 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating that extrinsic
evidence can be used before resorting to the contra proferentem doctrine, but
still holding to the proposition that, once the contra proferentem rule is applied
in an insurance policy dispute, the reasonable construction of the insured
trumps even the more objectively reasonable construction of the insurer).
74
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 121 (citing ALLAN
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES, § 603 (3d ed. 1995); Scott G.
Johnson, Resolving Ambiguities in Insurance Policy Language: The Contra
Proferentem Doctrine and Use of Extrinsic Evidence, 33 THE BRIEF 33, 37
(2004) (“If ambiguity is present, most courts today will not immediately
construe the ambiguity against the drafter but instead will attempt to remove
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applied those rules.”75 Yet even in states that use the general form
of the doctrine, extrinsic evidence is rarely important, due to the
lack of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ bargain when adhesive
contracts are involved.76
To the extent that courts are paring back the insurancetailored contra proferentem doctrine, they are presumably doing
so for at least the following reasons: first, rashly applying contra
proferentem before allowing extrinsic evidence can prevent the
court from upholding the parties’ intent;77 second, the strict
contra proferentem rule can cause economic inefficiency and
uncertainty;78 and third, since state legislatures and insurance
departments regulate insurance contracts, there is little need for
the courts to apply strong doctrines against insurers. On the other
hand, according to the doctrine’s supporters, the strong contra
proferentem rule discourages ambiguity, corrects unfairness,
redistributes wealth, and promotes uniformity of meaning in
mass-produced contracts for both insurers and insureds using
boilerplate-ridden insurance policies.79 Randall’s fears in this area
are based on a perceived practical difference between the strong
contra proferentem doctrine and the normal version of that rule.
This article will evidence, however, that many states use the
strong version of the doctrine, that states are generally consistent
in their approach, and that both the strong and normal contra
proferentem doctrines are largely protective of consumers because
of a general lack of extrinsic evidence surrounding insurance
policies.

the ambiguity by considering extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’
mutual intent.”); 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK
ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 14–18 (15th ed. 2010) (contra
proferentem should only apply when an ambiguity cannot be resolved by
extrinsic evidence).
75
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 121 (citing cases applying
law from New York, Washington, North Dakota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, Maryland, and New Mexico); see generally 2 COUCH ON
INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 22:22 (2010) (detailing the different approaches
to the contra proferentem doctrine in different jurisdictions).
76
See infra Part IV(A)(2).
77
WINDT, supra note 74, at § 603.
78
Rappaport, supra note 30, at 202–06.
79
David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard
Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 484–85 (2009).
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B. The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
The reasonable expectations doctrine, propounded by
Professor Keeton in 1970 to protect consumers, is simple in its
pure form: the consumer’s reasonable expectation of coverage
trumps policy language to the contrary.80 In the ensuing forty
years, the doctrine has been debated, praised, and defamed, but it
has never been widely followed as proposed. By 2000, most
courts that had experimented with the doctrine, fearing
inconsistency and unpredictability, narrowed it to follow the
insured’s reasonable expectations only when construing either
ambiguous or unconscionable terms against the insurer, or when
applying waiver, estoppel, election, and contract reformation.81
Since the insured’s reasonable expectations only trumped policy
language that was ambiguous, unconscionable, or otherwise
inequitable, the doctrine had been so modified as to become
unrecognizable just three decades after its proposal. By 2008,
courts had moved even further from the pure doctrine, with only
Alaska and Hawaii applying Keeton’s once-attractive approach.82
80

See Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the
Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L. J.
729, 733 (2000) (citing Keeton, supra note 6).
81
Id. at 735–47; See, e.g., Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J.
2010) (using the reasonable expectations doctrine after an ambiguity was
shown).
82
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 111–18. Hawaii’s
approach, however, does not appear to be as pure as Keeton’s original
proposal; in describing the law of contract interpretation, the Hawaii Supreme
Court refers to various contract principles that limit the scope of the
reasonable expectations doctrine, not the least of which is that reasonable
expectations are found not with the insured, but in the plain language of the
contract terms. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated that, “It is well settled in
Hawai’i that ‘the objectively reasonable expectations of policyholders and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have
negated those expectations.’ These ‘reasonable expectations’ are derived from
the insurance policy itself, which is ‘subject to the general rules of contract
construction.’ This involves construing the policy ‘according to the entirety of
its terms and conditions,’ and ‘the terms themselves ... should be interpreted
according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech unless
it appears from the policy that a different meaning was intended.’ ‘Because
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and are premised on standard
forms prepared by the insurer’s attorneys, we have long subscribed to the
principle that they must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and any
ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer.’” Del Monte Fresh Produce
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Thus, the reasonable expectations doctrine has become,
for most courts, merely an expansion of the insurance-tailored
contra proferentem rule: where there is an ambiguous term, the
court favors the insured by ruling according to her reasonable
interpretation of the language.83 As demonstrated below, Randall
gives a good overview of this doctrine’s history, but even that
history shows that the doctrine is neither pervasive nor helpful to
consumers.
C. Tort-Based Bad Faith Actions Flowing from the Insurer’s
Breach
“Bad faith” claims arising out of insurance policy disputes
are meant to deter insurers from treating their insureds unfairly,
particularly since so many claims involve catastrophic events in
the lives of insureds, and to make insureds whole for injuries
suffered due to their insurer’s improper actions. These claims,
based in the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
found in any contract, come in many forms — from breach of
duty to settle to failure to pay a claim.84 There is a further
division between first- and third-party claims: third-party claims
are for liability insurance, in which the insurer and the insured
(Haw.), Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 183 P.3d 734, 745 (Haw. 2007)
(citations and brackets omitted) (emphasis added). Alaska seems to follow a
more insured-centered approach, asking whether, from the perspective of the
insureds claiming coverage, the terms of the contract would have provided
coverage for the loss incurred. See C.P. ex rel. M.L. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996
P.2d 1216, 1223-25 (Alaska 2000).
83
Perhaps the best explanation of the modern view is from the Michigan
Supreme Court: “The rule of reasonable expectations clearly has no application
to unambiguous contracts. That is, one’s alleged “reasonable expectations”
cannot supersede the clear language of a contract. Therefore, if this rule has
any meaning, it can only be that, if there is more than one way to reasonably
interpret a contract, i.e., the contract is ambiguous, and one of these
interpretations is in accord with the reasonable expectations of the insured,
this interpretation should prevail. However, this is saying no more than that, if
a contract is ambiguous and the parties’ intent cannot be discerned from
extrinsic evidence, the contract should be interpreted against the insurer. In
other words, when its application is limited to ambiguous contracts, the rule of
reasonable expectations is just a surrogate for the rule of construing against the
drafter.” Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 786–87 (Mich.
2003).
84
See generally, RONALD D. KENT & WILLIAM T. BARKER, NEW
APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 2010).
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are “on the same side” against the third party. These claims often
arise in automobile, homeowner’s, commercial general liability,
professional liability, and directors and officers insurance. They
usually involve a duty to reasonably defend the insured against a
third party, a duty to reasonably settle with the third party or
insured (who will then settle with the third party), and a duty to
indemnify the insured if the case is lost. First-party claims are
between an insured, who makes the claim for herself, and the
insurer.
Third-party bad faith claims have been available for a
very long time, sounding both in contract and in tort.85 This early
acceptance of third-party claims by the states was likely due to
the fiduciary, “same-team” relationship between the insured and
the insurer,86 the ease with which insurers could manipulate
insureds to pay part of the claim,87 and the enormous liability and
litigation uncertainty to which insureds are exposed in thirdparty cases.88 All states recognize the third-party bad faith claim,
with some allowing it in tort and others in contract.89
First-party claims, on the other hand, are relatively new.
Of the forty-nine states that have addressed the issue, most states
(and a continually growing number of them) allow for tort-based
claims, a substantial minority allow expanded tort-like damages
with the cause of action based in contract, and only five reject
85

Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914) (seminal case
finding an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts);
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958) (allowing
for bad faith in tort or contract, at the plaintiff’s election, for third-party
refusal to settle cases); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 (Cal.
1973) (finding first-party bad faith against fire insurer and allowing for tort
damages); see generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, CommonSense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good
Faith in Bad Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1482–86 (2009).
86
See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799–801 (Utah 1985)
(noting that, in third-party situations, the insurer is a fiduciary to the insured
because the insurer and insured are on the same side against the third-party
claimant, while in the first-party situation, the relationship between the
insured and the insurer is more adversarial).
87
See JOHN M. BJORKMAN, ET AL., 3 LAW AND PRAC. OF INS. COVERAGE
LITIG. § 29:19 (2010).
88
See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 10.03[D][3]
(illustrating the uncertainty and possible liability by giving an example of a
homeowner whose guest, an outfielder for the Red Sox, slips on a banana peel
and suffers a career-threatening injury).
89
BJORKMAN, ET AL., supra note 87, at § 29:20.
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first-party claims altogether.90
In addition to these common-law remedies for bad faith,
states are active in passing consumer-protective legislation, much
of which provides for attorneys’ fees, interest, and even penalties
against insurers who, for certain types of insurance, act in bad
faith toward consumers.91 Legislatures are generally not shy
about stepping into the traditional realm of common law contract
if they find something that demands change. The extension of
bad faith remedies in the last few decades is another reminder
that legislatures are addressing the insured-insurer relationship.
In other words, Professor Randall is incorrect in saying that
remedies for insurer bad faith have shrunken recently; courts and
legislatures alike have actually been expanding this protection.
IV. Professor Randall’s Proposal
This section analyzes and critiques Professor Randall’s
recent proposal that judges stop using contract law, the focus of
which is parties’ intent, and instead use legislative goals to
interpret insurance policies. In her words, “[a]cknowledgment of
legislative and administrative involvement through mandated
provisions and policy approvals shifts the interpretative focus
from effectuating the parties’ intent to effectuating regulatory
goals.”92 She argues that it is necessary to move away from
contract law and toward regulatory goals because consumers are
being harmed by courts’ supposedly recent consumer-damaging
movement away from the reasonable expectations doctrine, the
strong version of the contra proferentem doctrine, and the
availability of bad faith actions in tort. This problem of declining
consumer protection, she says, comes against the sensitive
background of insurance policies as adhesive, standardized
instruments into which neither the insurer nor the insured can
insert preferred language (and whose contents reflect legislative
90

STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABILITY & DAMAGES §
2:15 (2010).
91
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (West 2010) (allowing both
penalties and attorneys’ fees for various types of insurance); GA. CODE ANN. §
33-4-6 (West 2010) (allowing penalties and attorneys’ fees for bad faith claim
denials); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155 (West 2010) (allowing penalties and
attorney’s fees for unreasonable denial or delay in paying claim); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22:656–22:658 (2010) (allowing penalty, interest, and attorneys’
fees). See generally ASHLEY, supra note 90, at § 9:15 (2010).
92
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 135.
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mandates rather than the intent of the parties). The solution to
this problem, she argues, is for courts to make public policy and
legislative intent — rather than contract law — the framework
for determining insurance policy disputes.
By analyzing Professor Randall’s proposal, this article
demonstrates that (1) courts have not recently shifted away from
consumer-protective doctrines; (2) notwithstanding adhesion,
mandated content, and pre-approval of forms, there is plenty of
room left for contract law and statutory regulations to
consistently coexist in insurance; (3) consumers are in fact better
protected than ever by state legislatures — whose job it is to
dictate public policy; and (4) even if there is a problem with
consumer protection, it should not be addressed through narrow
adjudicatory processes but through the broad legislative process
— which can best function against a backdrop of predictable
judicial interpretations of law rather than unpredictable judicial
beliefs of what legislatures desire. Particularly, the
implementation of Professor Randall’s proposal would lead to
both judicial and economic unpredictability, violations of
democratic and republican principles, and impractical, consumerharming uncertainty and litigation.
As a threshold matter, even though she is at times vague
on this point, it is assumed that Randall advocates some greater
exercise of judicial power than courts currently use. She does say,
rightly, that:
The normal exercise of judicial power permits a
court to determine that policy provisions are
ambiguous, deceptive, unfair, or contrary to
public policy within the meaning of the statute
and to construe the provisions to avoid statutory
violations occasioned by an insurance regulator’s
approval, accomplishing the legislative objective
of protecting insurance consumers.93
This, of course, is merely a statement of what courts already do.
A call for courts to start better protecting consumers surely
promotes judicial action beyond the status quo. Simply
suggesting that statutes be followed is not the purpose of her
proposal. Rather, she proposes interpretation based on vague
93

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 141 (emphasis added).
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“policy goals,” not just written statutes and the common law.
A. Demise of Consumer-Protective Common Law Doctrines?
Professor Randall sees a problem in what she considers to
be a judicial move away from consumer-protective doctrines —
particularly the strong contra proferentem doctrine, the
reasonable expectations doctrine, and the availability of bad faith
actions in tort for an insurer’s inappropriate actions.94 As
authority, Randall cites numerous cases from various
jurisdictions, which, she says, prove that courts have recently
decided to no longer treat insurance policies as special, and
instead to treat them as ordinary contracts subject to ordinary
contract principles.95 However, on closer examination, many of
the cases she cites either do not lend support to her argument or
actually articulate some or all of the principles she says are
dead.96
Additionally, many of the cases she uses are from federal
courts, which by definition have no binding precedential
94

Id. at 109–10.
Id. at 110, n. 9.
96
See, e.g., Kessler v. Shimp, 640 S.E.2d 822, 824–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting McLeod v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 444 S.E.2d 487, 491–92)
(advocating a strong contra proferentem doctrine, which does not allow for
extrinsic evidence before construing ambiguities against the insurer); Axis
Reinsurance Co. v. Melancon, 2007 WL 60968, at *3 (E.D. La. 2007) (simply
stating that, where an insurance company complies with statutes and
regulations, it can provide for clearly-stated exclusions in maritime insurance
contracts); Federated Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vaughn, 961 So.2d 816, 818–19
(Ala. 2007) (where a statute clearly gives a right to insurers to deny uninsured
motorist coverage, the insurer has the right to act on such a provision in its
policy); ABT Bldg. Prod. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472
F.3d 99, 116 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating the strict contra proferentem doctrine
under North Carolina law); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Riley, 899 A.2d 819,
833 (Md. 2006) (where an insurance policy is unambiguous in light of what a
reasonable person would understand by reading it, the job of the court is
finished); Moscarillo v. Prof’l Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 921 A.2d 245, 251 (Md.
2007) (quoting Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566, 569 (Md.
1997)) (“An insurance contract, like any other contract, is measured by its
terms unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violated thereby”; the
court, at 571, also recognized the contra proferentem rule as used in St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 438 A.2d 282, 288 (Md. 1981), which allows
the rule only after extrinsic evidence is allowed; thus, Maryland seems to be
one state that truly does apply ordinary contractual principles to insurance
policies).
95
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authority to abandon or modify state courts’ consumer
protections. Further, most of the cases cited are merely persuasive
authority and would be of little help to her argument if they were
binding authority. In some cases, courts give lip service to
traditional contractual principles only to go on to apply
insurance-specific doctrines meant to protect consumers. Thus, in
many of the states with which she finds fault, courts state that
they will apply ordinary contract principles in one sentence but
then invoke consumer-protective doctrines in the next.97 In her
discussion, Randall does not show that any specific state, recently
or otherwise, has moved away from consumer protection.
Further, she does not demonstrate that the differences in
consumer protection across states mean that state courts across
the country are generally abandoning consumers. The opposite is
true: consumers are more protected today than ever, thanks to
both legislative and judicial action.
This section addresses each of Randall’s three doctrinal
concerns in turn, illustrating that both the courts and legislatures
are well aware of consumers, as illustrated by the existence and
use of the three doctrines she discusses, in addition to the doctrine
of unconscionability and numerous statutory protections.
1. Strong Contra Proferentem Doctrine
Randall asserts that her claim is immediately necessary
because courts have recently begun applying ordinary contract
law in resolving insurance policy disputes by using contra
proferentem only as a last resort.98 To support this claim, she cites
cases from New York, Washington, North Dakota, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Maryland, and New Mexico that turn
out, under close examination, to be of little help to her thesis both
because these states are internally consistent and because the
cases themselves do not repudiate consumer protection. These
cases do not recently reject consumer protection because (1) the
current contra proferentem rules in these jurisdictions are not
“recent;” (2) some of them actually provide peculiarly strong
97

As a clear example, see Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s of London, 600 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 2010), quoted in Part III(A).
There, the court states that it will apply traditional contract principles, but
then goes on to articulate the strong version of the contra proferentem doctrine.
Pendergest-Holt, 600 F.3d at 569.
98
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 120.
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protection for consumers; and (3) even in those jurisdictions
without the strong rule, contra proferentem acts as the strong rule
in most cases because there is no extrinsic evidence to apply.
Randall begins with a case applying New York law,99 one
that oddly did not involve contra proferentem or the construction
of language against the drafter. There, the Seventh Circuit found
that a shipyard corporation had to pay continuing benefits to a
worker harmed while on the job because it did not notify the
secondary insurer of its obligation for some five months after the
primary insurer’s insolvency and the Department of Labor’s
notification to the shipyard of the corporation’s continuing
duties.100 Under the policy’s plain terms, the court found that
New York law applied and precluded coverage.101 In its
background section, the court did state that extrinsic evidence
cannot be used unless there is an ambiguity in the contract,102
perhaps implying that the contra proferentem doctrine could not
apply until extrinsic evidence had been explored. However, the
court did not have a chance to apply this possibility because
neither party claimed that the contract was ambiguous. Indeed,
the Seventh Circuit had no authority to move New York law
away from consumer protection even if it had tried. Due to the
case’s irrelevance to her thesis, Professor Randall’s purpose for
using it is unclear.103 A better summary of the New York law of
contra proferentem is seen in the case In re Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. (Malatino),104 which states that “[g]enerally, ‘policies of
insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and
strictly against the insurer.’”105 It also states that, “[w]here
ambiguity exists as to coverage, doubt should be resolved in favor
of the insured.”106 These cases paint a much more liberal usage of
contra proferentem in New York than Randall implies; indeed,
the cases indicate that courts are to liberally construe insurance
99
St. Paul Travelers Cos., Inc. v. Corn Island Shipyard, Inc., 495 F.3d 376
(7th Cir. 2007) (applying New York law).
100
Id. at 379, 384–87.
101
Id. at 386.
102
Id. at 383.
103
Id. at 384.
104
75 A.D.3d 967 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
105
Id. at 967-69 (quoting Penna v. Fed. Ins. Co., 28 A.D.3d 731, 731, (N.Y.
2006)) (also citing Gov’t Empls. Ins. Co. v. Kligler, 366 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y.
1977); Turkow v. Erie Ins. Co., 20 A.D.3d 649, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)).
106
Id. (citing Handelsman v. Sea Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 1258 (N.Y. 1994);
and Penna, 28 A.D.3d at 731).
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policies in favor of the insured. Finally, it is worth noting that in
Malatino,107 Penna,108 and other New York cases,109 the court did
not resort to extrinsic evidence until after construing an
ambiguity in favor of the insured, even though some federal
courts applying New York law have used extrinsic evidence in
their analysis.110 Thus, New York law has been stable and
protective of consumers for a very long time.
After New York, Randall moves on to Washington,
implying that courts there have recently repudiated the strong
contra proferentem doctrine; she cites Willing v. Cmty. Ass’n
Underwriters of Am., Inc.111 In that case, the court did not rely on
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent; rather, it construed the
contract against the insurer without reference to extrinsic
evidence — even though it stated that the general contra
proferentem rule in Washington would allow for extrinsic
evidence before construing the contract against the insurer.112
There was no extrinsic evidence to apply in Willing, as is often
true in policy disputes, because “contracts of insurance ordinarily
consist either of provisions required by statute or of preprinted,
industry-drafted forms that are rarely subject to the sort of
negotiation that would produce useful extrinsic evidence.”113
Therefore, the law in Washington is that if an ambiguity is
detected, extrinsic evidence (which will likely be available only if
the insured is sophisticated enough to actually negotiate, or at
107

Malatino, 75 A.D.3d at 970.
Penna, 28 A.D.3d at 731–32.
109
Nassau Plaza Assocs., L.P. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.3d
1159 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Markotsis v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 4723/07, 2008
WL 2446332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 15, 2008); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l
Cas. Co., 47 A.D.3d 770, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citing Hartol Prods. Corp.
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 47 N.E.2d 687, 690 (N.Y. 1943)); NIACC, LLC
v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 51 A.D.3d 883, 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citing
Mostow v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 668 N.E.2d 392, 423 (N.Y. 1996), which held
that “ambiguities in an insurance policy should be construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer” and did not apply extrinsic evidence before
using the contra proferentem doctrine).
110
See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Group Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225
F.3d 270, 276 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing other federal cases to support the notion
that extrinsic evidence is to be used before applying contra proferentem).
111
No. C06-1357RSL, 2007 WL 1991038 (W.D. Wash. July 5, 2007).
112
Id. at *2.
113
Andres v. Am. Std. Ins. Co. of Wis., 134 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Or. App.
2006). Extrinsic evidence in insurance cases is, as Randall recognizes in note 41
of her article, rare. Randall, supra note 2, at 121 n. 41.
108
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least debate or explain, policy terms) is allowed before the contra
proferentem rule is applied. However, since extrinsic evidence is
normally unavailable as to the parties’ intent, the contra
proferentem rule in Washington usually functions like the strong
contra proferentem rule in resolving ambiguities in favor of
insureds — particularly because Washington courts first look to
the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of undefined terms
rather than the parties’ particular meaning, providing more
opportunity to the court to find ambiguity since the insurer’s
specialized meaning is not permitted.114 Additionally, the rule is
even more favorable to consumers in certain contexts: “The rule
strictly construing ambiguities in favor of the insured applies
with added force to exclusionary clauses which seek to limit
policy coverage.”115 Finally, even if Washington’s rule is a slight
practical departure from the strong contra proferentem rule, it is
not a recent departure that the state legislature has had time, if
desired, to address.116
Professor Randall also implies that North Dakota common
law has recently moved away from the strong contra proferentem
doctrine, citing Sloan v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., which
used the doctrine in the context of an ERISA plan—a context
governed by federal law.117 There, the federal district court,
which was reviewing a Social Security Administration decision
de novo, noted that “[t]he district court may admit evidence
outside the record in a case involving the denial of ERISA
benefits if the participant shows good cause.”118 While contra
proferentem might not be as strong in North Dakota courts when
evaluating administrative adjudicatory pronouncements over
ERISA plans, North Dakota generally has adhered to a strong

114

See Holden v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 239 P.3d 344, 347 (Wash.

2010).
115
Am. Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 854 P.2d 622, 625 (Wash. 1993), aff’d en
banc, 865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994).
116
See, e.g., Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 208, 212
(Wash. 1978) (applying extrinsic evidence and stating the general rule that
ambiguities should be construed against insurer).
117
433 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1048 (D.N.D. 2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 999 (8th Cir.
2007) (if ERISA plan is deemed ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be
considered; “any ambiguities should be construed against drafter only as a last
step”).
118
Id. at 1038–39 (citing Ferrari v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 278
F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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version of contra proferentem in insurance policy disputes.119 The
extremely limited and federally-controlled area of ERISA should
not guide, and it is no indicator of, North Dakota’s stance on
insurance policy interpretation generally.
Next, Randall cites a New Jersey case, McNeilab, Inc. v.
North River Ins. Co.,120 as an example. In a federal decision more
than twenty years old, the court in McNeilab simply noted that,
while the general rule in New Jersey is to strictly construe
insurance contracts against the insurer, large, sophisticated
insureds (here, the enormous Johnson & Johnson) should not be
subject to the same favorable treatment.121 Indeed, the general
New Jersey rule is as follows:
If the terms are not clear, but instead are
ambiguous, they are construed against the
insurer and in favor of the insured, in order to
give effect to the insured’s reasonable
expectations. This is so even if a ‘close reading’
might yield a different outcome, or if a
‘painstaking’ analysis would have alerted the
insured that there would be no coverage.122
This combination of reasonable expectations with the ambiguity
doctrine offers particularly strong protection for New Jersey
119
Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D. 1998)
(“‘[A] term in an insurance policy should be construed ‘to mean what a
reasonable person in the position of the insured would think it meant.’
‘Limitations or exclusions from broad coverage must be clear and explicit.’
‘[W]hen the language of an insurance policy is clear and explicit, the language
should not be strained in order to impose liability on the insurer.’ However,
any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the meaning of an insurance policy is
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. ‘If the
language in an insurance contract will support an interpretation which will
impose liability on the insurer and one which will not, the former
interpretation will be adopted.’”) (internal citations omitted). Note that there is
no mention or use of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of
contract formation. However, there may be certain instances in which extrinsic
evidence is allowed: “[I]n rare [insurance] cases, parol evidence may be used to
decipher the intention of the parties.” Hanneman v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 575
N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1998).
120
645 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1986).
121
Id. at 546.
122
Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010) (internal citations
omitted).
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consumers.123 However, at least in the context of coverage
disputes between sophisticated insurance companies, extrinsic
evidence is allowed.124
Next, Professor Randall uses Pennsylvania law as an
example, citing Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pa. Lumbermens
Mut. Ins. Co.125 The court in that case did not apply contra
proferentem.126 The general Pennsylvania rule is: “Where a
provision of a policy is ambiguous [(meaning that it is reasonably
susceptible to different constructions and capable of being
understood in more than one sense)], the policy provision is to be
construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”127
Although this definition does not preclude the use of extrinsic
evidence, such use is rare outside the context of sophisticated
insureds.128 Further, the principles found in Pennsylvania’s rules
have been around for many years, suggesting that regulators have
had plenty of time to recognize and resolve problems with
contract interpretation that may harm consumers.129
Professor Randall cites Arkansas law next, namely State
Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality.130
123

See Doto v. Russo, 659 A.2d 1371, 1376–77 (N.J. 1995) (giving clear
explanation of full protection afforded by the mixed doctrines of reasonable
expectations and contra proferentem).
124
Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285,
1289 (N.J. 2008) (stating that extrinsic evidence can be used in the context of
one insurance company suing another over meaning of insured company’s
policy; court went on to use history of disputed term to inform interpretation).
For more on the special contra proferentem application for sophisticated
insureds and insurer disputes, see COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at §
22:24.
125
641 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
126
Id.
127
Madison Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106
(Pa. 1999); see also Kropa v. Gateway Ford, 974 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2009).
128
See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1192
(Pa. 2001) (allowing trade usage of term, to inform court’s decision as between
Sunbeam Corp. and its insurer, even though contract was unambiguous);
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing
extrinsic evidence to inform the meaning of terms of an agreement between
sophisticated parties); see also 1 BJORKMAN, ET AL., supra note 87, at § 1:11
(noting that contra proferentem rule in Pennsylvania is usually strict against
insurer, unless insured has negotiated terms of contract).
129
See, e.g., Brams v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 A. 855, 856 (Pa. 1930) (stating
general rules of contra proferentem).
130
258 S.W.3d 736 (Ark. 2007); see also Gilstrap v. Jackson, 601 S.W.2d
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There, the court noted that the general rule of insurance policy
interpretation was that any ambiguities would be “construed
liberally in favor of the insured”; the holding went on to recognize
that “an exception to this general rule [is] where disputed
extrinsic evidence is offered to establish what the ambiguous
language means.”131 However, the Arkansas courts sometimes use
extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity, which can then be
construed against the insurer.132 This consumer-friendly option
would normally be precluded by the more general rule that an
ambiguity only arises if two reasonable interpretations can be
made when the term is construed in its “plain, ordinary, popular
sense.”133 Additionally, as is common of insurance contract
disputes elsewhere, many cases in Arkansas do not use extrinsic
evidence before applying the contra proferentem doctrine.134 It
appears that courts either use the doctrine loosely to justify their
holdings, or more likely have no extrinsic evidence to apply.
Finally, Arkansas is not a state that has only recently repudiated
the strong contra proferentem doctrine or created uncertainty as
to the rule; as with other states, the legislature has had many
years to resolve any problems it sees with courts’ protection of
consumers.135
Randall also uses Maryland law as an example, citing
Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass’n.136 The Collier court
stated that, in Maryland, “[w]e do not follow the rule, adopted in
some states, that insurance policies are to be construed most

270 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Elam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 57 S.W.3d 165
(Ark. 2001).
131
State Auto, 258 S.W.3d at 743.
132
McGrew v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc., 268 S.W.3d 890
(Ark. 2007).
133
Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 16 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Ark. 2000);
accord Hon. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is
Contract Interpretation A Legal Question and When Is It A Fact Question?, 5
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81 (2010).
134
See, e.g., Norris, 16 S.W.3d at 246 (where mother of boy who injured
appellant’s son — a very sympathetic plaintiff — was found to be covered by
insurer’s duty to defend and provide liability coverage due to ambiguity);
Gawrieh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 117 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding ambiguity in night club’s liability policy, thereby requiring partial
coverage for shooting death and injuries).
135
See, e.g., Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. W. Gen. Ins. Co., 816 S.W.2d 638
(Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
136
607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. 1992).
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strongly against the insurer.”137 Thus, the rule is that when
ambiguity is still present after the court considers extrinsic
evidence, the term will be construed against the drafter. This rule
seems to be followed in both first-party138 and third-party
coverage.139 Even though most cases of ambiguity will have little
extrinsic evidence to apply, Maryland’s rule is not an iteration of
the strong contra proferentem doctrine. Yet, contrary to Randall’s
inference, nothing about Maryland’s rule is a “recent” departure
from the strong contra proferentem doctrine; its rule has been
consistent for more than one hundred years.140 Further, as noted
in subsection IV(a)(3), infra, Maryland’s legislature is well aware
of consumers.
Finally, Randall uses the New Mexico case of Bird v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. as an example of courts’
repudiation of the strong contra proferentem doctrine.141 There,
extrinsic evidence was allowed to inform an ambiguity before the
contract was construed against the insurer.142 However, one key
to modern policy interpretation in New Mexico is that, as in
Arkansas, the courts follow an express policy of allowing extrinsic
evidence to create an ambiguity that then benefits the consumer.
When a rule allows the creation of ambiguities in a contract that
is clear and unambiguous within its four corners, and when those
ambiguities will, by the rule’s definition, favor the insured, that
rule provides a protection to consumers that even the strong
version of contra proferentem — which applies only when an
ambiguity arises from the four corners of the document — does
not provide. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied this
doctrine in Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,143 in which
nothing within the four corners of the insurance policy was
ambiguous.144 The policy clearly excluded the plaintiff from
recovering a large sum of money from her parents’ automobile
137

Id.
See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CSX Corp., 131 F.3d 135 (4th Cir.
1997) (concerning life insurance policy).
139
See, e.g., Chang v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 897 A.2d 854, 858 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2006) (concerning liability policy).
140
See Planters’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Deford, 38 Md. 382, 403 (1873); see also
Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486, 489 (Md. 1985).
141
Bird v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 343 (N.M. Ct. App.
2007); see also Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970 (N.M. 1997).
142
Bird, 165 P.3d at 347.
143
12 P.3d 960 (N.M. 2000).
144
Id. at 965.
138
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insurer because at the time of her accident she was both married
and living away from home, but the court allowed an ambiguity
to be created by way of extrinsic evidence and then construed
that ambiguity in favor of the insured.145 Even in many states
with “strong” contra proferentem rules, the plaintiff’s case would
have ended when the court saw how clear the policy language
was. Thus, even though ambiguities arising out of the four
corners of the document can be resolved by extrinsic evidence —
something that weakens the strong contra proferentem doctrine
— the fact that ambiguities can be created by extrinsic evidence
in the first instance allows the contra proferentem doctrine to
favor the insured in situations otherwise precluding recovery.
Finally, in addition to this strong protection, New Mexico courts
have been using their version of the doctrine for some time.146
Assuming that Randall cites the cases most favorable to
her argument, her claim that the courts are moving away from
the protection of the contra proferentem doctrine, particularly
that they are moving away rapidly or recently, is simply invalid.
In fact, even the normal contra proferentem doctrine, which
allows extrinsic evidence to clarify an ambiguity before
construing the contract against the insured, almost certainly
protects nearly all insureds as much as the strong contra
proferentem doctrine because, given the standardized application
process, there is little or no evidence of the parties’ intent for
courts to apply before favoring the insured; additionally, even
where extrinsic evidence is allowed, insureds often want it
admitted because it will favor them (or at least reflect their
intent), either by its clarification or its reinforcement of
ambiguity, which will almost certainly be resolved in their
favor.147
145

Id. at 965–66.
For a discussion of the history of New Mexico courts’ usage of extrinsic
evidence to inform ambiguities, see Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,
871 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1994) (stating that the Supreme Court moved away from
the four corners approach in 1987 for contracts generally, and that in 1991 and
1993 it had specifically applied the new rule to insurance contracts; note that
the court, even in 1994, recognized that extrinsic evidence was to be used to
“determine whether the parties’ words are ambiguous,” thereby leaving the
door open for courts to create ambiguities out of consideration of extrinsic
evidence.).
147
See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 4.08[E]
(“In insurance cases, the theoretically disadvantaged often have more effective
weapons at their disposal and may argue for the admission of extrinsic
146
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Even in states applying the normal contra proferentem
doctrine, extrinsic evidence is only remotely possible, but
certainly not a necessary, antecedent to applying the doctrine.
This is evidenced by the many cases that, although decided in a
state allowing extrinsic evidence, do not hold that such evidence
may be part of the equation; such economy of words is likely
brought on because in those cases there is no extrinsic evidence as
to the parties’ mutual intent. Finally, if there is extrinsic evidence
of mutual intent, it would be at the very least an indication that
the insured understood what she was purchasing and thus is not
the passive, hapless consumer that the strong version of the
doctrine is meant to protect.
2. Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
Professor Randall attempts to prove that the pure form of
Professor Keeton’s148 reasonable expectations doctrine, which
allows an insured’s reasonable expectations to trump even clear
policy language, has all but disappeared, even while failing to
show that it ever held much sway in its original form. She states,
“[t]he doctrine of reasonable expectations has given way to firm
judicial pronouncements about enforcing unambiguous policies
as written.”149 Actually, the reasonable expectations doctrine
never took hold in most states in its pure form, was confusing and
uncertain in jurisdictions that did use it, and is commonly seen as
a failed and untenable doctrine.150 Today, as Professor Randall
states, a majority of jurisdictions apply reasonable expectations
as a complement to the contra proferentem doctrine; after an
ambiguity is shown, the reasonable expectations of the insured
will trump the insurer’s explanation of the policy’s terms either
before or after the use of extrinsic evidence to clarify the
ambiguity.151 Thus, while it is true that the pure form of the
evidence.”).
148
Keeton, supra note 6.
149
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 111 (emphasis added).
150
See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 824 (1990) (stating
that only sixteen states had adopted the doctrine, some of which never
accepted its pure form); Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable
Expectations after Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425
(1998) (concluding that problems inherent in the doctrine itself account for its
failure to develop into a coherent, principled body of law).
151
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 114–15.
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reasonable expectations doctrine does not currently exist in
almost all states, the doctrine was never popular, rarely
predictable, and not even theoretically justified.152 There is little
wonder why most states that ever used it have rejected it.
The doctrine in its pure form would appear to be helpful
to consumers, but it would almost certainly harm them by
contributing to inconsistency and unpredictability that would
raise transaction costs, including litigation costs.153 That is, the
doctrine would harm consumers by creating uncertainty;
moreover, insurance underwriters would not know whether their
clear, unambiguous contractual language — although approved
by the insurance department of both the state in question and
those of other states — would be held up in court.154 This
uncertainty would lead to higher premiums and/or narrower
coverage since insurers would have to spend more time and
money negotiating terms, understanding and recording the
consumer’s expectations from the outset, litigating disputes, and
paying attorneys’ fees.
Further, with judges making ad hoc decisions based on
each plaintiff’s potentially reasonable expectations, precedent
could hardly guide present or future decisions. Indeed, each
successful plaintiff, with different traits and under divergent
circumstances, could be seen as creating a new standard. As one
commentator observed on the economic disincentives such a
doctrine would create: “[i]nsurers must know with certainty that
contract language will be judicially respected. Absent such
certainty, only the most cavalier insurer would attempt to write
business.”155 With such uncertainty, insurers would have to begin
152
Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 296 (1998) (noting that insureds
are unlikely to develop specific expectations from interactions with their
agents and that insureds generally misunderstand basic coverage and
exclusions anyway; thus, the theoretical justification for the doctrine that
insureds have expectations when they purchase coverage is unjustified).
153
For one of the many economic arguments against the pure reasonable
expectations doctrine, see Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1462, 1476–93 (1989) (showing that
the reasonable expectations doctrine is harmful from an economic standpoint,
since it would decrease predictability and certainty, thereby leading to higher
transaction costs — including court costs).
154
Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 150, at 431–32.
155
Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy
Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985).
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charging premiums that accurately reflected the risk to them,
which would necessarily include the risk that a court might
determine a particular plaintiff’s expectations to be reasonable.
In short, to remain solvent, insurers would either increase rates or
narrow the breadth of coverage offered – both exacerbating the
effects on a likely already-vulnerable consumer.156
Additionally, since the pure doctrine would in a sense call
the entire contract into question in every instance, and since each
plaintiff would offer a fact-intensive problem of whether she in
fact had a reasonable expectation of coverage at the time she
signed her application, transaction costs in the form of attorney’s
fees and court costs would skyrocket, further raising rates.157
Thus, the pure reasonable expectations doctrine was a
failure from the start, especially from a consumer standpoint, and
nearly all courts have rightly rejected it or applied it only after
ambiguity is shown. Given its anti-consumer effects, Professor
Randall’s advocacy of the doctrine is peculiar to say the least.
3. Bad Faith Actions Sounding in Tort
Professor Randall claims that courts have recently begun
shifting bad faith from a cause of action in tort to one arising
under contract alone; as a result, she asserts, insureds in many
third-party cases (and some first-party cases) suffer because they
can only recover consequential damages if they are covered by
the insurance policy; whereas, if they were allowed a private
action in tort, they would be able to recover for consequential
damages regardless of whether they were covered by the
insurance policy.158 There are numerous problems with her
position. First, courts have been largely consistent over the years,
steadily finding the bad faith cause of action to sound in contract,
tort, or both. Second, in most states, remedies are largely the same
regardless of whether the cause of action sounds in tort or in
contract. Finally, the protection from bad faith has in fact been
expanding lately, not shrinking, and consumers are heavily
defended both by statute and common law.
Professor Randall does not indicate how a tort-based
rather than a flexible, contract-based cause of action would be so
favorable to insureds in this area, and even states that “[t]he
156

Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 150, at 432.
Id.
158
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118–19.
157
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classification may be inconsequential in some instances, since
contract remedies, flexibly applied, can afford full compensation
in many cases.”159 Significant differences between a bad faith
contract claim and a bad faith tort claim can arise in certain
cases, but not all of these differences favor tort as the preferred
consumer-protective source. Perhaps the main differences
between allowing a bad faith claim in tort versus contract are:
“(1) [where] the claim is characterized as a tort, generally a shorter
limitation period applies; (2) classifying it as a contract claim may
affect whether the claim is assignable to a third party; . . . (3) if
the claim sounds in tort, a broader measure of damages may be
available to the insured”;160 and (4) the strict liability standard of
care in bad faith contract cases is easier for consumers to meet
than the negligence or intentional standards of bad faith tort
cases161 — that is, if the cause of action is found under contract,
the question is often not whether the insurer negligently or
intentionally caused harm, but only whether the insurer
breached.162 From a consumer standpoint, two of these factors —
(1) and (4) — favor contract, and the remaining two favor tort.
The superiority of a tort claim is unclear where states apply
contractual remedies flexibly, especially in insurance cases.
“In addition to insurance custom and practice and
common law judicial precedent, statutory law usually establishes
a right of action for any policyholder who is the victim of an
unfair claim practice.”163 Even statutes that do not provide a
cause of action can establish a benchmark against which courts
can measure insurer actions to determine whether common law
bad faith is established. At the very least, violation of the statute
is evidence that the insurer acted in bad faith.164 Additionally,
159

Id. (citing JERRY, supra note 54, at § 25G, (3d ed. 2002)).
BJORKMAN, ET AL., supra note 87, at § 29:20.
161
BAKER, supra note 8, at 111.
162
See, e.g., Id. (citing Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352
S.E.2d 73, 78–79 (W. Va. 1986), for proposition that insureds should be entitled
to strict liability standard against their insurers.). In Hayseeds, the court
stated: “[W]e hold today that when a policyholder substantially prevails in a
property damage suit against an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to
damages for net economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, as well as an
award for aggravation and inconvenience.” Id. at 80. An exception to this
dichotomy is found in Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) (applying
quasi-negligence standard to bad faith stemming from contract).
163
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 10.03[E].
164
KENT & BARKER, supra note 84, at § 10.05
160
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states have adopted, usually with minor modifications, a version
of NAIC’s Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and
Deceptive Practices in the Business of Insurance model act, under
which the states provide an avenue for insurer punishment and,
in some jurisdictions, another private cause of action, whether
explicit or implied in the statute.165
Indeed, states have generally been expanding the
availability of bad faith claims both by the common law and by
statute. Both legislatures and courts have been well aware of this
issue for some time. Particularly, many of the cases that Professor
Randall cites come from jurisdictions with either a common law
or statutory remedy for bad faith. For example, she cites a firstparty case166 based on Maryland law as one of a “significant
number of recent decisions stat[ing] that contract rather than tort
provides the theoretical basis for bad faith breach in first-party as
well as third-party actions.”167 Yet the explicit Maryland rule that
common law bad faith actions are based in contract dates at least
to 1961, with roots extending to 1904.168 More importantly, in
2007, the Maryland legislature passed a law giving insureds the
ability to sue insurers for first-party bad faith in property and
casualty disputes.169 This statute is perhaps the starkest example
of why Professor Randall’s proposal should not be adopted by
courts. The Maryland courts, by applying consistent contractbased law for decades, gave the legislature a predictable judicial
landscape against which elected lawmakers could adopt a rule
fitting the policy needs of the state, which in this instance was a
private cause of action for first-party breach of good faith claims.
Since the passage of the statute, it has been liberally construed to
165
See id. at § 10.04 (citing numerous state approaches and giving nuances
of each).
166
Hartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2001).
167
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118.
168
See Mesmer v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Md. 1999)
(“[I]t is only when a breach of contract is also a violation of a duty imposed by
law that the injured party has a choice of remedies.”) (quoting Heckrotte v.
Riddle, 168 A.2d 879, 881–82 (Md. 1961). See also Samuel v. Novak, 58 A. 19,
20 (Md. 1904). Randall gives no indication that this long-standing doctrine has
ever been used differently in insurance cases in Maryland. Indeed, even as
early as 1988, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated, “We are aware
of no Maryland cases which recognize as a tort action the bad faith failure of
an insurer to pay a first party claim.” Johnson v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 536
A.2d 1211, 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988). Thus, this is not a new concept in
Maryland.
169
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1701 (West 2010).
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favor insureds.170
Other cases from jurisdictions that are currently moving
bad faith from tort to contract are similarly unsupportive of
Randall’s argument that consumers are at a disadvantage in firstparty171 and third-party172 claims. Additionally, there is little
170

See, e.g., Cecilia Schwaber Trust Two v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
636 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (D. Md. 2009) (rejecting, in favor of a broad
interpretation of the statute, the oft-limiting “fairly debatable standard” used
by many courts to allow bad faith suits only where payment is not fairly
debatable).
171
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118 n.31. For example,
she offers Coleman Dupont Homsey v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 433,
437 (D. Del. 2007), but first-party claims of bad faith have been based in
contract in Delaware for fifteen years. See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 256 (Del. 1995). Further, Delaware allows recovery
under the contractual remedy of bad faith for costs and fees, plus expectation
and consequential damages. See, e.g., Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel,
The Emergence and Potential Consequences of First-Party Insurance BadFaith Liability, 28 J. INS. REG. 3, 7 (2008). Under Virginia law, for which
Randall cites HHC Assocs. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 256 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508
(E.D. Va. 2003), bad faith actions have sounded in contract law since at least
1966. See, generally, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 146 S.E.2d 220, 228 (Va.
1966). However, Virginia courts allow for expanded, tort-like damages in bad
faith claims. See Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 462 S.E.2d 81 (Va. 1995).
Further, a Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-209 (West 2010), and its
citing decisions (including Price) have addressed this issue, providing that
individuals who win bad faith disputes against insurers are able to recover, in
addition to the contractual payment, costs and fees rather than tort damages.
Thus, at least in Virginia, Randall’s fear that courts have been recently
reverting to contract principles is unfounded; further, the legislature has
spoken on the issue and is thus aware of judicial interpretations. Randall’s
New Jersey example, Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993), clearly
cuts against her argument because there the court states that, “Compensation
should not be dependent on what label we place on an action but rather on the
nature of the injury inflicted on the plaintiff and the remedies requested. An
insurance company’s breach of the fiduciary obligation imposed by virtue of
its policy, by its wrongful failure to settle, ‘sounds in both tort and contract.’”
Pickett, 621 A.2d at 452 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.
of Am., 323 A.2d 495 (N.J. 1974). The court went on to expand the remedies
available under contract, while imposing a negligence-like standard of care.
With Rova Farms, New Jersey became one of the first states to address the
first-party cause of action sounding in tort by mixing it with contract law
shortly after California led the way in 1973. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510
P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). For a discussion, see Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop.
Mgmt., Ltd., No. 97-CV-3496 DRD, 2009 WL 5064757 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2009).
She also cites Bhattacharyya v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 799 N.Y.S.2d 158
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004), in which the court simply stated that the plaintiffs had
not pleaded facts sufficient to rise to the level of a tort of bad faith.
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reason to worry about consumers who, in states allowing only a
cause of action under contract, might be improperly precluded
Bhattacharyya, 799 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The New York first-party rule is, like the
New Jersey Rule, that although the cause of action sounds in contract, broad
tort-like remedies are available under it. Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins.
Co., 886 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 2008); Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins.
Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y. 2008); See generally Charles Platto et al.,
New York’s New “Good Faith” Standard—What Does It Mean for “Bad
Faith”?, 30 NO. 6 INS. LITIG. REP. 165 (2008). Next, Randall cites Zenor v.
Standard Ins. Co., No. Civ. 01-1226-FR, 2002 WL 31466503, at *1 (D. Or. Apr.
3, 2002). Oregon indeed is a state whose courts have stayed away from a firstparty cause of action in tort altogether, allowing only contract-style recovery
for these plaintiffs. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Love It Ice Cream Co., 670
P.2d 160, 165 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Strader v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 39 P.3d
903, 905-06 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). Interestingly, however, the legislature in
Oregon—which has already provided for unfair claim settlement complaints
and attorneys’ fees for winning plaintiffs—has begun to consider proposals for
a bad faith statute. See, e.g., H.B. 2791, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009)
(would allow for a private action in contract or tort for both first- and thirdparty claims).
172
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 119 n.32. For example,
she gives New York, citing New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2003), which applied New York law.
In New York, however, the contract roots of third-party bad faith, even in the
insurance context, have been present since at least 1976. Roldan v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (citing Town of Poland v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 385 N.Y.S.2d 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that a
bad faith claim did not sound in negligence but in breach of contract, and that
the statute of limitations was therefore six years)). Randall also uses Missouri
as an example, citing Ross v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-0811-CV-WFJG, 2007 WL 1774443 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2007) as a case that has recently
stated that bad faith action for refusal to defend is contract-based, while a bad
faith action for refusal to settle sounds in tort. Yet, as with other states, this
principle has been around in Missouri for decades. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins.
Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1950) (holding that bad faith actions for refusal
to settle are based in tort, even though they arise out of contracts); See also
Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (detailing
the difference between bad faith actions for refusal to settle, which are based
in tort, and bad faith actions for duty to defend, which are based in contract;
the court also notes, as Professor Jerry did later (see JERRY, supra note 54), that
even if the plaintiff recovers only under the duty to defend, he still must
recover such an amount, including attorney’s fees, as to put him in the position
he would have been in had the defendant not breached the contract). Further,
both New York and Missouri have statutes under which insureds can recover,
at least, interest and attorney’s fees when suing their insurer. N.Y. INS. LAW §
5106 (McKinney 2010); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 375.296, 375.420 (West 2010)
(allowing for penalty). She cites cases from various other jurisdictions, most of
which have similar statutes.
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from having their legitimate claims heard. After all, if an insurer
has no relationship with the consumer, then there is no duty of
good faith connecting the insurer to the consumer. Alternatively,
if there is a relationship and the insurer unreasonably denies
coverage, then that act alone is likely to be seen as a breach of the
duty of good faith.173 Randall herself cites, with no apparent
disfavor, Professor Jerry’s assertion that the difference in a bad
faith claim arising from contract as opposed to one in tort is of
little consequence because contract remedies are often applied
flexibly enough to give full compensation.174 Thus, Randall’s call
to arms — to combat “recent decisions” that have supposedly
turned against the widespread use of bad faith as a tort arising
out of a breach of insurance policy — is largely unnecessary.
In fact, it appears that a shift has occurred in the opposite
direction, even regarding the relatively new doctrine of first-party
bad faith: “Recent decisions . . . have tipped the scales decisively
in favor of the first-party tort and have clearly established it as
the majority rule.”175 As of this writing, twenty-eight states
recognize the bad faith cause of action in tort and five more allow
for tort-like damages; thirteen have rejected the bad faith tort;
one requires a malicious mind on the part of the insurer before
finding bad faith in tort; and Massachusetts has yet to decide (it
has little reason to do so, since its statutory remedies are so
strong).176 The trend, then, is for more, not less, protection of
consumers by courts and legislatures in the realm of bad faith.
4. Conclusion
The strong contra proferentem doctrine is still alive and
well in many of the jurisdictions that Randall implies to have
recently deserted it, and, given the lack of extrinsic evidence for
passive insureds, most consumers are protected just as well by the
doctrine in jurisdictions applying the normal-version as those in
173

See, e.g., Hardy v. Hartford Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2001)
(illustrating how surprising it would be for a court to find bad faith where the
insurer was reasonable in its denial of coverage: “[T]he district court did not
err in failing to conclude that Hartford lacked good faith even as a matter of
law, because Hartford had no duty to provide a defense or coverage to
Hardy.”).
174
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118 n.30 (citing JERRY,
supra note 54, at § 25G).
175
ASHLEY, supra note 90, at § 2:15.
176
Id.
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strong-version jurisdictions. Additionally, the pure reasonable
expectations doctrine is a consumer-harming principle that never
took hold in most courts, and its demise is a happy event. As for
bad faith protection, it is actually on the rise. These three
doctrines in their varying forms, when coupled with such
ubiquitous measures as the unconscionability doctrine177 and
statutory remedies, prove that consumer protection is at the
forefront of insurance law.
Legislatures have, in almost every instance, had many
years to contemplate consumer-protective rules where they see
failures in the common law. Indeed, the area of consumer
protection has been, and continues to be, heavily addressed by
state legislatures in favor of insureds. Randall, in support of her
argument that courts have recently begun ignoring consumers in
favor of rigid, insurer-favoring contract doctrines, cites case law
from various jurisdictions. She fails to show, however, any reason
why consistent differences between different states, with some
states using more liberal protections than others, should be
viewed generally as a judicial movement away from consumer
protection warranting such a drastic proposal. That is, courts in
one state, using more or less consumer-protective doctrines, do
not directly affect courts in other states.
Further, Randall has not tied the states together or shown
that the courts in any one state have stopped caring about
consumers. The closest she comes to noting a trend is in her
discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine. But that
doctrine is harmful, encouraging costly litigation and creating
uncertainty for consumers and insurers alike; judges have acted
prudently and in consumers’ interest by rejecting this doctrine.
Finally, Randall fails to show that courts in any one state have,
through time, repudiated the plight of consumers in favor of
traditional contract law or that legislatures are providing
inadequate consumer protections. In short, her evidence, which is
not logically tied to interstate or intrastate movement away from
consumer protection, fails to support her thesis.
Consequently, the problems Randall finds with judicial
interpretation are in fact not problems at all for consumers.
Giving her the benefit of any doubt, however, this article will
now address what she offers as her second reason for reform: that
177

See supra note 70 for a very brief overview of the unconscionability
doctrine.
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the supposed current movement away from consumer-protective
doctrines is made within the special context of contracts subject
not to private agreement but, rather, to legislative intent. Her
proposal – namely that judicial interpretation and construction
be reformed in light of regulatory goals — is a dangerous plan
that would harm consumers by creating uncertainty, instability,
and, consequently, higher rates or reduced coverage.
B. Insurance Policies Are Special, but They Are Still Contracts
In explaining and bolstering her proposal to protect
consumers from what she sees as judicial movement away from
consumer-protective doctrines, Professor Randall argues that
insurance policies are not really contracts between private parties
and therefore should not be evaluated by courts as such. She
states that consumers have no freedom of contract because
consumer insurance is doled out in the form of adhesive,
standardized instruments. Consumers are faced with the choice to
either purchase insurance coverage for a risk or not—there is no
negotiation of terms. Insurers, likewise, have no freedom of
contract because of statutorily-mandated inclusions and required
departmental approval of policy language.178 This lack of freedom
to contract, she argues, suggests that insurance policies are not
really contracts to be evaluated according to the intent of parties
buying and selling coverage as reflected in contractual language.
Indeed, she says, “‘[N]o intent of the parties’ undergirds the
substantive terms and provisions of the policy,”179 indicating
instead that the intent of the legislature undergirds those terms.
In this view, the legislature and insurance department — not the
parties — have effectively created the agreement, and when the
language of that agreement reaches a court for interpretation, the
court should seek the intent of the legislature and insurance
department — not that of the parties. Because both consumers
and insurers are constrained in their ability to create or modify
terms, Randall says, “[T]he routine judicial invocation of the
principle of freedom of contract in insurance cases is a
fundamental error.”180
Her thesis is imperfect because: (1) insureds, as a group,
benefit from the lower transaction costs of adhesive, standardized
178

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 126–35.
Id. at 108.
180
Id. at 124.
179
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contracts and are not precluded from reading their policies or
clarifying meaning with their insurance agents; (2) insurers also
benefit from the lower transaction costs that come with adhesive,
standardized contracts and have the ability to create and modify
the language of their policies—legislatures do not mandate nearly
enough language to, for example, put the ISO out of business; and
(3) legislatures mandate language because they expect insurers to
include it in standardized, adhesive contracts so that consumers
will be predictably and uniformly protected by it. If what
Professor Randall says is true, that legislative and not private
intent is reflected in insurance relationships, then legislatures
have the ability to cleanly modify the interpretive system if they
choose. Legislative acquiescence in and encouragement of judicial
interpretation under contract law speaks volumes about how
legislatures want to protect the public. When legislatures want
coverage or protection for consumers, they mandate it; courts
then comply with the mandate. This simple system is not broken.
Professor Randall’s proposal that judges predict the thoughts of
legislatures in interpreting insurance policies places the third
governmental branch ahead of the first.
“On any view, parties need not bargain when the cost of
doing so outweighs the gains from customizing the transaction.”181
By purchasing adhesive contracts that are subject to efficiencyenhancing and consumer-protecting regulation,182 insureds benefit
from lower premiums and lower opportunity cost. As Randall

181

Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1208 (1983).
182
There is a concern that adhesive contracts are agreed to by boundedly
rational consumers, who take only some contractual terms (especially price)
into account when deciding to purchase insurance. Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1203, 1203 (2003). This can lead to insurers writing terms favorable to
themselves in areas that consumers ignore, thereby keeping more of the
cooperative surplus of the deal for themselves. Id. One solution to this problem
is to have legislatures correct this market failure by mandating terms and preapproving language. Id. This is exactly what legislatures do. Where
legislatures fail to protect consumers, courts pick up the slack by using
doctrines such as unconscionability, contra proferentem, and bad faith against
insurers. Professor Korobkin’s suggestion that courts go farther, evaluating
adhesive contracts based on consumers’ bounded rationality (as predicted by
social science) and economic forces, would be impossible for generalist judges
to apply. Such specialized and broad-reaching decisions should be made by
legislatures.
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recognizes,183 insurers need standardized data to make accurate
actuarial predictions, to charge relatively low premiums, and to
offer insurance as widely as possible. Standardized data requires
near-standardization of forms, and the Insurance Services Office
has grown to both gather data and offer such standardization.
While it is true that many consumers do not read their
insurance policies, insurers do not prevent them from doing so. At
the very least, concerned consumers could read and understand
the plain language of the policy and address questions and
clarifications with their insurance agents, thereby coming to
know what is and is not covered. Indeed, consumers in
jurisdictions like New Mexico and Arkansas could, if they
wished, even create helpful extrinsic evidence through this
clarification process.184
Randall claims that insurance policies should not be
treated as contracts because insurers cannot freely include all of
the terms they want, and must include some terms that they
perhaps do not want. Her claim in this area is that regulators
impose rules on insurers to protect consumers, yet she admits
that, “These limitations obviously do not preclude invocation of
the principle of freedom of contract in policy interpretation.
However, the scope and extent of regulatory control over the
content of insurance policies strongly suggests that freedom of
contract is not an appropriate analytical starting point.”185 Thus,
her argument seems to be that insurers have some freedom of
contract, but not enough to actually use contract as an
interpretive judicial paradigm. In her words:
The extensive regulation of insurance policy
language, ranging from legislatively-mandated
provisions to required administrative approval of
policies, renders the model of private contract and
the principle of freedom of contract irrelevant in
interpretation of insurance policies. Courts should
approach the construction of insurance policies
mindful that they are not individually negotiated
bargains but highly regulated documents; the
judicial goal should be ascertaining and
effectuating regulatory goals, rather than the
183

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 124.
See supra Part IV(A)(1).
185
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 126 (emphasis added).
184
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illusory intent of the parties.186
Additionally, contrasting her proposal with the present system,
she argues:
[W]here policies are viewed not as a bargain
between parties, but as standard documents
governed by statute and requiring regulatory
approval, the analysis changes. Considerations
external to the policy become relevant, including
the statutory framework and the intent of the
legislature; the power of the regulator and the
nature and aims of the approval process, as well as
the role of the judiciary in reviewing administrative
actions; and broad public policy concerns, as
defined by statute, regulation, and decisional law.187
That is, she not only advocates applying statutes, but applying
vague purposes that may be discovered by evaluating the
statutory framework, in addition to broad public policy concerns
that might be gleaned from laws, departmental regulations, and
even common law. Thus, Randall incorrectly bases her proposal
on the notion that the language of insurance policies has little, if
anything, to do with private parties — even the intent of the
insurance company is ignored and is, from its rates to its terms,
controlled and dictated by state regulators. A few areas do have
commonly mandated forms, such as state fire and workers’
compensation policies.188 Generally, however, the state simply
mandates specific coverage provisions or precludes some
exclusions, and the policy language used to reach those goals is a
decision resting with the company.189 If states generally wrote
policies, those policies would be public law that courts, subject to
constitutional limitations, would have to follow. Additionally, if
insurance policies were really created by legislatures, then any
claim that they do not protect consumers would be a direct
186

Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
188
See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 2010) (providing New
York’s standard fire insurance form); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2052.002
(Vernon 2010).
189
See Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 129–34, for a general
discussion.
187
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attack, not on courts, but on those elected by the public to create
protective laws.
However, as Randall admits,190 insurance policies are not
public laws passed by legislatures. They are regulated, to be sure,
but setting regulatory boundaries does not make policies more or
less than contracts; today, nearly all contracts — not just
insurance contracts — are standardized, adhesive forms into
which legislatures willingly insert themselves, either by way of
the UCC or other legislation.191 Most contracts that consumers
enter into are very much like insurance policies from a freedom of
contract perspective, and ending the application of contract law
to insurance contracts would likely lead to unprofitable
disruptions in other areas of contract law. More importantly,
insurance companies need uniformity and predictability when
providing insurance to large numbers of people, and they
therefore welcome standardized language — even language
mandated by a legislature — as long as it is predictable.192 As
Stempel puts it:
Of course, the super-adhesive nature of insurance
policies does not make them “bad” or legally
suspect. Standardized adhesion contracts are
probably the majority of contracts in use today and
are widely enforced. . . . [T]hey not only lower
transaction costs but facilitate risk spreading
through developing a risk pool of policyholders all
subject to the same contract language.193
190

Id. at 126 (no longer claiming that insurance policies are all but
statutes, she merely says that freedom of contract is “significantly limited for
companies as well [as] for policyholders”).
191
See Slawson, supra note 36, at 529 (“Standard form contracts probably
account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made. Most
persons have difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than
by standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they probably never
have. But if they are active, they contract by standard form several times a
day. Parking lot and theater tickets, package receipts, department store charge
slips, and gas station credit card purchase slips are all standard form
contracts.”).
192
See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 66, at 1105-06 (explaining that
insurance companies need consistency and predictability; therefore, even
language that courts interpret against them will continue to be used as long as
the court rulings are predictable, this argument is easily extended to
statutorily-mandated language).
193
Stempel, supra note 59, at 830.

Wilkerson Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

Adjudicating Insurance Policy Disputes

3/23/2011 3:39:00 PM

347

Additionally, most terms in a given insurance policy are
not mandated by law. The insurer chooses or modifies ISO
language, or creates its own language within statutory parameters
and requirements. In almost every instance, it is the insurer who
submits its forms to the regulators for approval — not the
regulators who submit forms to the insurer to employ.
Randall’s own discussion, in which she looks to regulatory
goals as the guiding light for judges, demonstrates that
legislatures, not courts, have the duty to protect consumers
through new laws. Doctrines such as unconscionability, contra
proferentem, fraud, and bad faith allow courts to protect
consumers while preserving legislative policymaking power. As
she recognizes, rate regulation; pre-approval of policy forms’
content, readability, and format; mandated inclusion of specific
types of coverage; limits on an insurer’s ability to cancel policies;
and other safeguards have largely been the province of
legislatures194 — legislatures that create these laws while choosing
not to fundamentally modify consistent interpretive judicial
frameworks. Legislatures do protect consumers by mandating
some policy terms and prohibiting some insurer actions.
However, legislatures have left most insurance decisions to the
private contracts, through which private parties buy and sell
insurance subject to approved language. Nothing about this
scheme chosen by legislatures suggests that courts could capably
take the place of lawmakers by judging insurance disputes on the
basis of unstated regulatory goals, and state regulators suggest
their comfort with judicial use of contract law by not regulating
more.
Everything about the current system, with state
policymakers regulating insurance and state courts interpreting
insurance policies as regulated contracts, points to legislative
contentment with the mechanisms by which consumers are
protected. Indeed, legislatures have, thus far, refused to turn
insurance into something akin to a public utility, even though
they presumably could if they wished. Legislatures, in the very
act of mandating and approving policy language, indicate that
they want insurance policies to be treated as contracts. Truly, by
making laws within the framework rather than modifying that
framework, legislatures manifest their desire to treat insurance
194

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 126–35.
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policies as contracts.
Courts are required to apply insurance laws,195 and they
have to give deference to authoritative administrative
pronouncements,196 such as those from insurance commissioners.
Randall does not suggest that courts are ignoring their
legislatures or insurance departments when a law or regulation
applies. Instead, she wants the courts to take over the legislative
role where judges consider that legislatures have not done enough
in reaching their own goals. Additionally, Randall does not
recognize that insurers themselves acquiesce to mandated policy
language because, mandated or not, such language is
predictable.197 Predictability is the watchword of all actuarial
work, and without it, insurance companies would have to narrow
the scope of their coverage or increase rates. Even if a mandated
term appears to impede upon insurance companies’ freedom of
contract, the companies prefer fixed, predictable language over
the alternative. Indeed, much more important than the separation
of powers problem is the problem of implementation and what
effect judges’ use of regulatory goals to interpret insurance
policies would have on insurers and insureds alike.
C. The Practical Effects of Professor Randall’s Proposal
Randall appears to advocate, as does most everyone, that
courts continue to apply the law where the legislature clearly
speaks. She states, however, that when the legislature has not
mandated policy language by law:
[C]ourts should rely on interpretive constructs that
195
For example, where an insurance policy violates a statute, the policy or
the offensive term must be struck down — even though the insurance
department gave implicit approval of the policy by not rejecting it. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Assocs. Life Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
196
Although implicit policy approval does not normally warrant much
deference because the department’s inaction causes such approval, where the
department acts authoritatively, it is normally given deference. See, e.g.,
Craley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 895 A.2d 530, 537 (Pa. 2006).
197
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978) (recognizing the need for and legitimacy of predictability in
the actuarial process even while striking down a retirement plan provision
requiring women to pay longer than men given their longer average lifespan.
However, the ban did not apply retroactively to plans already in place because
of the presumed good faith with which pension fund administrators used
actual science in reaching their conclusions).
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emphasis [sic] regulatory goals and strategies:
solvency of insurance companies, fairness to
consumers, and availability of insurance198. . . .
Courts often approach the task of interpretation of
insurance provisions without acknowledgment of
the legislative and administrative role in the
drafting and approval of insurance policies. . . .
Acknowledgment of legislative and administrative
involvement through mandated provisions and
policy approvals shifts the interpretative focus
from effectuating the parties’ intent to effectuating
regulatory goals.199
This appears to be a call for courts to ask, “What would the
legislature do?” In easy cases — those that have a statute directly
on point, for example — there would be no need to surmise the
legislature’s intentions regarding solvency, fairness, or
availability because the statutory directive would be clear.
However, courts would have to guess what the legislature would
want in the innumerable situations that have heretofore been
governed by the common law or, subject to mandated language,
are still subject to more than one interpretation.200 Under this
scheme, a new, unpredictable common law of insurance contracts
would arise — one that is based not on relatively consistent
judicial decisions, but rather on what particular judges think
particular legislatures would want if called upon to resolve
particular disputes between litigants.
Among the practical problems with this proposal are: a
lack of political accountability for the new judicial policymakers;
economic inefficiency both within and between states; and a
litigation explosion, with legislative intent becoming relevant to
the discovery process, and insurance policy language being
uncertain until ruled on by a court in light of the legislative goals
presented.
First, the role of judges is not to weigh policy goals; their
purpose is to adjudicate disputes under law; even though many
198

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 108.
Id. at 135.
200
The fact that there are disputes over coverage in areas with mandated
forms, such fire insurance and workers’ compensation, shows that even
legislatively-creative language might be up for interpretation on some
occasions.
199
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judges201 acquire their positions by election and are subject to
political implications of their decisions.202 But no judge, at the
trial level or otherwise, can weigh and balance the public interest
of an entire state. Judges, elected or appointed, simply cannot do
the legislature’s job.
Second, Professor Randall’s proposal would not only harm
intrastate consistency by creating inconsistency from term to term
and from election to election, but also the generally consistent
application of terms between states. Policy language — generated
by the ISO or otherwise — frequently becomes popular across
many states, and states interpreting contract terms for the first
time are often aided by decisions of other states’ courts that have
interpreted the term. Courts may even find a term unambiguous
as a matter of law if it has been interpreted consistently by other
states’ courts.203 Under Randall’s proposal, when interpreting and
construing un-mandated insurance policy language, courts in
each state would have to look first, and perhaps exclusively, to
the goals of their own legislature. They could not seek help from
other states’ courts unless they were convinced that the
regulatory goals in each state, under the current legislatures of
each state, were substantively identical. Thus, Randall’s proposal
would contribute to harmful interstate inconsistency of term
interpretation, leading almost certainly to higher administrative
costs for insurers, higher premiums for insureds, more federal
201
Currently, thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790–91 (2002) (O’Connor,
J., concurring); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 U.S. 2252, 2274
(2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom?
Why Popular Elections are Preferable to Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1 (2004) (describing and critiquing the general systems of judicial
elections and appointments).
202
In these states, “[E]lected judges — regardless of whether they have
announced any views beforehand — always face the pressure of an electorate
who might disagree with their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench.”
White, 536 U.S. at 782. There is little doubt that elected judges would, if asked
to explicitly consider policy arguments, favor those arguments that they think
will get them re-elected in their district. Thus, Randall’s proposal would be
even more problematic in these states, where adjudications of insurance policy
disputes would be made by a single person who is politically accountable to a
limited geographic constituency.
203
See Fisher v. Tyler, 394 A.2d 1199, 1202–03 (Md. 1978); Hanneman v.
Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1998) (finding the
interpretations of other states’ courts persuasive in determining the meaning of
the term “borrow”).
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discomfort with state regulation of insurance, and, ultimately, to
federal regulation.
Playing down the significance of her proposal in
encouraging inconsistency, however, Professor Randall states
that the outcome of many disputes will be the same regardless of
whether courts evaluate insurance policy language from a
contractual or a regulatory perspective.204 This, she says, is
because “the legislative and administrative role in mandating or
approving policy language suggests that the language of policies
should be enforced.”205 Thus, she reasons that legislatures and
insurance departments are so heavily involved in regulating
insurance policies that their intent is reflected in policy language,
and, therefore, there is apparently little need for a shift in judicial
interpretation. This article has already shown, not least by the
very existence of the ISO, that this notion is unfounded.
However, admitting that legislatures and insurance departments
have near plenary power over insurance policies, even if they
choose not use it, which is what Professor Randall seems to
ignore, is fatal to her proposal because within that admission is a
recognition that the legislature, well aware of what courts are up
to, can increase or decrease their hold over insurance at any time.
In other words, Randall recognizes that legislatures and
insurance departments already hold the power to regulate,
mandate, and approve insurance policies. With so much power to
dictate what courts see and how they construe language, it is
natural to assume that regulators have not been more explicit
because they (and, by extension, their constituents) are content
with courts interpreting insurance policies as regulated contracts
between private parties, rather than legislation.
Third, underlying Randall’s proposal is a concern for
consumers, yet consumers would almost certainly be harmed by
her plan. She laments that “[i]n recent years, courts have been
inclined to enforce insurance policies as written, with the goal of
effectuating the intentions of the parties and the result that the
insurance company typically prevails.”206 Thus, she argues, if
courts interpret insurance agreements with the sole purpose of
effectuating the intent of legislatures and insurance departments,
204

Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 108.
Id.
206
Id. at 107. This statement is logically inconsistent with her claim just
one page later that under both contract interpretation and under her proposal,
courts will in most instances uphold the policy language.
205
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“courts can protect consumers’ substantive rights regarding
insurance coverage, rather than an illusory freedom of
contract.”207 This underlying goal to help consumers is one of the
considerations that state legislatures, which actually hold the
power to make improvements to the system, take into account
when creating laws that regulate insurance.208 That it is not the
only consideration belies the fact that Professor Randall
overlooks, in this article at least, the purposes of regulation
beyond consumer protection. Randall’s proposal is basically to
turn courts into policymaking consumer advocates that attempt
to act for the legislature when the legislature has not acted.
Legislatures struggle to do what is best for the public in light of
all of the goals of insurance regulation, including consumer
protection, insurer solvency and profit margins, consumer access
to insurance protection, and pricing standards.209 Advising courts
to consider only one of those goals in making their decisions is
incredibly narrow and would be detrimental to the balance that
legislatures attempt to strike between all of the legitimate,
sometimes competing goals of regulation.
However, courts, if they begin following Randall’s
proposal at all, might not take her underlying purpose of
consumer protection as their main goal; they might, in fact, try to
balance all of the policy considerations surrounding insurance
regulation. The fact that legislatures acquire mountains of
information from economic, fiscal, and political analysts when
deciding how to balance regulatory goals begs the question of
how courts might be expected to carry out this process. Courts
must judge cases on the evidence and arguments before them—
that is, the facts and the legal and policy arguments that the
parties present in relation to those facts. Parties find facts to
insert into the record mainly through the discovery process.
Under Randall’s proposal, legislative facts and regulators’
legal and policy arguments would become the focus of litigation.
Assuming the insurance department or some other regulatory
207

Id. at 109.
Of course, some laws — such as those ensuring solvency of all insurers,
thereby preventing guaranty fund action — do benefit responsible insurers,
but it must be recognized that most insurance regulations have a pro-consumer
intent. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7009 (McKinney 2010) (allowing insurance
superintendent to prohibit or limit a captive insurer’s investments so as to
promote solvency).
209
Baker, supra note 8, at 637–56.
208
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representative did not intervene to represent public policy, an
attacking insured would have to prove that consumer protection
is the policy goal that needs following. Alternatively, insurers
would likely argue for insurer solvency or some other favorable
regulatory purpose. Whatever their arguments, the parties would
have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation—in
striking contrast to legislative ideals, in which the deliberative
process promotes the public, as opposed to the litigant’s, interest.
Private interest would push litigants to use the discovery process
to emphasize their strengths and downplay their opponent’s.
They would likely issue subpoenas to the insurance department
and might even seek information from the state legislature in
seeking to prove that their interpretation of legislative goals is
most valid. Such a system, in which legislative facts,
pronouncements, and regulatory intentions would become
relevant to particular court cases, would explode the discovery
process, making it veritably boundless. In such a system,
consumer plaintiffs would almost certainly be overcome by the
vast resources of insurance companies that could be used to seek
out, sift through, and present policy arguments that support their
position. Judges would have the unenviable task of sitting in the
legislature’s stead, attempting to protect the plaintiff while
weighing other policymaking goals presented by the parties and
deciding what the current legislature would do with the narrow
question presented by the litigants.
If Randall’s proposal is implemented and judges follow
her suggestions by ignoring regulatory balancing and focusing
mainly on consumer protection, the regulatory framework will
crumble, leading toward insolvency, higher rates, and restricted
coverage. If, on the other hand, judges sit as proxy for the
legislature but give weight to insurers’ evidence of the balance
that should be struck, then insureds will almost certainly be
unable to maintain the pace and breadth of discovery and trial
preparation that the resourceful companies will display. Either
way, transaction and litigation costs will increase, uncertainty of
coverage will be rife, and consumers will lose.
As a final note, Professor Randall does not address the fact
that consumers are more protected than ever, both by judicial
doctrines,
including,
perhaps
most
importantly,
the
unconscionability doctrine, and legislative fiat. Further, she does
not recognize that legislatures, not courts, are those with the
power to regulate the business of insurance under the McCarranFerguson Act. More importantly, she does not address the burden
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of unpredictability and, ultimately, costs to both insurers and
consumers that would result if her proposal were implemented.
1. Professor Randall’s Proposal Is Much Like the Failed
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
As this article has shown,210 Professor Keeton’s reasonable
expectations doctrine failed because it was unpredictable and
would have led to increased litigation, higher premiums, and less
coverage. Indeed, under that doctrine, an insured could not know
what his policy meant until a judge made a ruling on its
meaning—perhaps not in accord with the insured’s wishes. The
doctrine would have allowed clear, unambiguous policy language
to be trumped by the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, and
“[t]he shape of the analysis in a particular case will depend on the
structure and provisions of individual state insurance codes,
administrative procedure acts, and regulations, as well as the
particulars of the department’s review and approval process.”211
Such destabilization and unpredictability is rightfully eschewed
by courts. As stated by one:
There is no logic nor reason to create an obligation
contrary to and beyond the clear, plain language of
a policy and Professor Keeton provides none. To
create such would oblige a party at the whim of one
whose personal interests are served by the
conversion of an expectancy to a right. It would
permit the rewriting of a contract by a court,
without limitation except by what is reasonable for
an insured to expect.212
Professor Randall’s proposal would also have courts
ignore clear policy language, and would fail for the same reason
that the pure reasonable expectations doctrine failed:
unpredictability. If no statute spoke directly to a litigated issue or
if the issue was unclear even in the face of a legislative mandate,
that issue would go to the court, and the court would have to
consider legislative goals in deciding the question. However,
210

See supra Part IV(A)(2).
Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 136.
212
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Marnel, 587 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D. Conn.
1983).
211
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where there is no statute on point, the court would either have to
ask what past legislatures would have done—analogizing to
statutes perhaps in other areas of the insurance code—or what
the current legislature would do with the question. Whether the
legislature actually wanted to decide that question would be
irrelevant; whether the legislature wanted the courts to continue
applying specialized contract law to insurance policies would also
be beside the point. The court would have to look at the parties
(which would certainly be few) and the issue in the case (which
would necessarily be narrow), rely on counsels’ arguments (which
would vary in quality and depth with the wealth of the litigants),
and attempt to adjudicate the dispute by balancing regulatory
goals (which would always be broad, deep, varied, and distorted
by the lens of litigation). Nobody would know, either from court
to court at any given time or legislature to legislature through
time, what un-mandated policy language meant. Insurers, also
uncertain, would not be able to predict risk and return; they
would have to protect themselves by charging higher rates,
narrowing the scope of coverage, or leaving the state. Consumers
would pay higher prices for insurance, would more often litigate,
and would be uncertain of the scope of their insurance
coverage—uncertain, that is, until the legislature somehow
mandated clearer language, wrote forms itself, or possibly
authorized the insurance department to write unambiguous forms
based on regulatory goals that only the legislature can know and
balance. Since Randall proposes that courts look to legislative
goals, and since legislative goals are uncertain from day to day
and from election to election, the uncertainty of judicial decision
making under the proposal could only be solved by the legislature
actually writing or mandating language by law. In other words,
Randall’s proposal, if adopted, would circle back to the true,
authoritative regulators of insurance: legislatures.
But the proposal should not reach that point. It should be
immediately dismissed, and courts should be left to continue their
relative and, hopefully, predictable approaches to interpreting
contracts. Legislatures, too, should be left to balance consumer
protection with the other goals of insurance regulation against a
predictable judicial backdrop.
V. Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that insurance is a heavily
regulated industry, and that regulation has always been at the
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level of state legislatures. Legislatures, with the help of insurance
departments they create, have the duty and ability to issue laws
and regulations and to approve forms and mandate coverage.
Legislatures can, and sometimes do, even regulate the
interpretation and construction of contract language and
consumer representations. This scheme, which keeps rates
relatively low, coverage broad, and insurers solvent, should not
be shaken by Professor Randall’s proposal.
Although her ire is directed at courts for not protecting
consumers, the true problem, if any, is that legislatures, conscious
of the largely constant judicial approach within each state, are
not doing enough to protect consumers. Randall does not accuse
the courts of disregarding legislative mandates or administrative
suggestions. Instead, she accuses the courts of applying contract
law to contracts. The courts exist to resolve cases and
controversies by applying law to facts—not to create law in the
legislature’s stead. As recognized in Couch,213 where the
legislature has mandated language or interpretive rules, courts
should apply that law; if their concern is for consumers, courts
can best serve by consistently applying the insurance-specific
contractual principles already in place and allowing legislatures
to weigh policy concerns.
Legislatures have the power to protect consumers by
creating laws in light of the large amounts of information needed
to weigh competing policy purposes. To her credit, Randall asks
that courts apply legislative mandates where available—but this
is something that courts have always done. The problem with her
proposal arises in the areas of insurance that legislatures have left
to private parties’ contractual agreements. There, Randall asks
that courts apply “regulatory goals”—not laws or longstanding
principles of interpretation—to resolve disputes. This scheme
would lead to uncertainty for consumers and insurance
companies, infringement upon legislatures’ mandate to create
laws, increasing litigation, and a widening discovery process, all
213

“The rules of statutory interpretation, rather than the contra
proferentem rule, apply when the terms of an insurance contract are dictated
by statute; in such circumstances, the real question is or ought to be the intent
of the legislature, not the intent of the parties to a contract in which neither has
any real say as to the terms of the agreement.” COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra
note 7, § 22:22 (citing Matarese v. N.H. Mun. Ass’n Prop. Liab. Ins. Trust,
Inc., 791 A.2d 175 (N.H. 2002); Chenard v. Commerce Ins. Co., 799 N.E.2d
108 (Mass. 2003)).
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while raising transaction costs and insurance premiums.
Thus, where the legislature has passed a law, the court
should follow it. Likewise, where the insurance department has
issued a rule, the court should give it deference. Otherwise,
judges should be left to apply predictable contract doctrines,
extra-protective of consumers or otherwise, against which
informed and deliberative legislatures can further protect
consumers if such protection is in the interest of the state. To
borrow Judge Dorsey’s language: “There is no logic nor reason to
create an obligation contrary to and beyond the clear, plain
language of a policy and Professor [Randall] provides none. To
create such would . . . permit the rewriting of a contract by a
court, without limitation except by what [judges think
legislatures would do with the question].”214

214

Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 587 F. Supp. at 624.

